The first section of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals contains a teleological argument, the aim of which is to show that the natural purpose of human reason lies not in securing happiness but in morality. While the teleological argument is widely considered to be digressive and unconvincing in the secondary literature, in this article I attempt to show that the argument is neither digressive nor unconvincing. I argue that it fulfills an important synthetic task in the Groundwork (even if in a preliminary manner), that it is consistent with Kant’s views on natural teleology at the time, and that the criticism of happiness contained therein is as convincing as Kant’s criticism of happiness in the rest of the treatise.

中文翻译：

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康德道德形而上学的目的论论证

康德的《道德形而上学基础》的第一部分包含一个目的论论证，其目的是表明人类理性的自然目的不在于确保幸福，而在于道德。尽管目的论论据在二手文献中被普遍认为是偏离论据和令人信服的，但在本文中，我试图证明论据既不偏离论据也不令人信服。我认为，它完成了《基础工作》中的一项重要综合任务（即使是初步的方式），这与当时康德对自然目的论的观点是一致的，并且其中包含的对幸福的批评与康德对幸福的批评一样令人信服。其余论着中的幸福。