abstract:

The Protagoras’s case against akrasia comes in two stages. First, at 352b–c, we get an extremely quick argument grounded on knowledge as an epistemic ideal. This argument does not persuade the many, and so the dialogue turns, starting at 355a, to a technical and carefully developed argument that proceeds on an entirely different basis. This argument has considerable force, but only once we make certain idealizing assumptions about an agent’s ability to grasp the unitary, homogeneous nature of value. Reading the dialogue in this way offers the further tantalizing possibility of showing us precisely where Socrates’s thought leaves off and Plato’s begins: that the dialogue takes off from the famous and historical Socratic rejection of akrasia and then attempts to ground that dictum in a novel argument, one that displays Plato’s characteristic interest in the distance between surface appearances and ultimate reality.

摘要：

该普罗泰戈拉反对阿克萨斯的案子分为两个阶段。首先，在352b–c，我们得到了一个基于知识作为认知理想的极其快速的论证。这个论点并不能说服很多人，因此对话从355a开始转向技术和经过认真发展的论点，并在完全不同的基础上进行。这一论点具有相当大的作用力，但是只有在我们对代理人掌握统一的，统一的价值性质的能力做出某些理想化假设之后，这种情况才发生。以这种方式阅读对话提供了进一步诱人的可能性，可以向我们准确地向我们展示苏格拉底的思想落在何处以及柏拉图的开始：对话从著名的历史性苏格拉底式的对阿克拉斯的拒绝中脱颖而出，然后尝试以新颖的论点来扎根这一格言，