Reviewed by:

• The Singular Voice of Being: John Duns Scotus and Ultimate Difference by Andrew LaZella
• Mary Beth Ingham CSJ

While much has been published on the philosophical and theological positions of John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), the univocal concept of being continues to be a source of debate and, for some, condemnation. In this ambitious study, LaZella investigates how central the labor of division can be in order to “cut the univocal concept of being at its joints” (1). Throughout, LaZella engages with classic and contemporary scholarship to achieve a twofold end. First, he clearly shows how, for Scotus, the univocal concept of being does not fall victim to the stereotypical renderings of some proponents of analogy. Second, he analyzes how the univocal concept of being is differentiated. Here is revealed “ultimate differentiation” found throughout reality, from the transcendental disjunctive intrinsic modes (infinite/finite) through the formal distinction (ultimate specific difference) to individual differentiation (known as haecceitas).

Differentiation, far from a deficiency of being, perfects it. With this insight, LaZella frees Scotus from a Parmenidean negativity that ultimately necessitates analogy. He asks, “What is required to think and say being in a single sense? . . . To conceive of nonreified [End Page 147] difference in order to divide being” (14). Part 1 of the study defends nonreified difference as central to an adequate grasp of Scotus’s project that depends upon understanding being as a real concept, with an emphasis on both “real” and “concept” (42–43). Chapter 3 explores how Scotus broadens and deepens the concept of ultimate difference beyond Aristotle. He broadens it when he applies it to intrinsic modes (finite/infinite), and he deepens it beyond the categories to the transcendental level. By means of the in quid/in quale distinction, being appears as the only thing that is in quid (what something is); ultimate differences are in quale (how or of what kind a thing is). In this way, Scotus’s ontological account plays on the “what” of being, along with the “how” of being, in order to affirm the positive perfection of ultimate singulars, whether infinite (God) or finite (creatures). Here lies the dimension of the “less than actual” yet not wholly “conceptual” that perfects the univocity of being.

Throughout, LaZella rightly argues for Scotus’s foundational effort. This effort identifies the more basic, more ultimate, irreducibly positive principle that grounds participation. In his defense of Scotus, LaZella correctly notes how univocity grounds both analogy and participation. He repeatedly reminds the reader that difference, for Scotus, is not a deficiency (as it is for analogy). Ultimate difference is the irreducibly positive principle within all reality.

Part 2 plays out this core insight in three areas: the intrinsic modes of being as ultimate differences (infinite/finite); some specific differences (formal distinction); the naked singular (haecceity). Chapter 4 considers the modal differentiation of infinite/finite, explaining how infinite magnitude is not vague or boundless. Rather it is the wholeness of perfection that cannot be exceeded. God is “most singular” in this regard (107–9). Chapter 5 contrasts ultimate with nonultimate specific differences, proposing a new model of division that is nonoppositional and positively differential. Once again, Scotus uses and deepens Aristotle and “uproots the Porphyrian tree” (124). With chapter 6, the study reaches the most foundational basis for individual, finite singularity: the “being different” of an individual as a perfection. Haecceity is all that is left, once one has excluded signate matter, accidents, quantity, actual existence, and the double negative (“not-not x”) as factors of individuation. Haecceity in an individual is an act determining the reality of a species. At this point in his argument, LaZella surprises when he concludes that as a pure determination, haecceity is a quale (how), not a quid (what), that is, a formal determination. However, by making this a differentiation rather than a “contraction,” I fear that haecceity loses the positive aspect given to it by Scotus and reveals a void at the heart of each “naked singular” being.

The value of establishing an ontology based on...

审核人：

• 存在的奇异声音：约翰·邓斯·斯科特斯和安德鲁·拉泽拉的终极差异
• 玛丽·贝丝·英厄姆CSJ

尽管有关约翰·邓斯·斯科特斯（John Duns Scotus，1266-1308年）的哲学和神学立场已发表了许多著作，但明确的存在概念仍继续引起争论，并在某些情况下受到谴责。在这项雄心勃勃的研究中，拉泽拉（LaZella）研究了分裂劳动的中心地位，以便“割断在关节处的明确概念”（1）。在整个过程中，LaZella均采用经典和现代奖学金来达到双重目的。首先，他清楚地表明，对于Scotus而言，明确存在的概念如何不会成为某些类推支持者的陈规定型观念的受害者。其次，他分析了如何区分明确的存在概念。这是整个现实中发现的“终极差异”，haecceitas）。

区别远非存在的不足，而是完美的。有了这种见识，LaZella将天蝎从Parmenidean的消极情绪中解脱出来，这最终需要类比。他问道：“在单一意义上思考和说什么需要什么？。。。为了划分存在而构想未修饰的[End Page 147]差异”（14）。该研究的第1部分捍卫了未归化的差异，这是充分理解Scotus项目的关键，该项目取决于将理解理解为真实概念，并强调“真实”和“概念”（42-43）。第3章探讨了Scotus如何拓宽和深化亚里士多德以外的终极差异概念。当他将其应用于内在模式（有限/无限）时，他将其拓宽，并且将其扩展到超越范畴之外的范畴。通过在英镑/在quale区别，是将显示为唯一在英镑（什么东西是）; 最终的差异在于品质（事物的方式或种类）。通过这种方式，Scotus的本体论解释基于存在的“内容”以及存在的“方式”，以确认最终单数（无论是无限的（上帝）还是有限的（生物））的正完美性。这就是“比实际少”但又不是完全“概念”的维度，它完美地体现了存在的唯一性。

在整个过程中，LaZella正确主张Scotus的基础性工作。这项工作确定了更基础，更最终，不可减少的积极原则，这是参与的基础。在为天蝎座辩护时，拉泽拉正确地指出了单纯性是如何将类比和参与作为基础的。他反复提醒读者，对于Scotus而言，差异不是缺陷（就像比喻一样）。最终的差异是所有现实中不可避免的积极原则。

第2部分从以下三个方面阐述了这一核心见解：作为最终差异（无限/有限）的内在模式；一些特定的差异（形式上的区别）；裸单数（haceceity）。第4章考虑了无限/有限的模态差异，解释了无限幅度是不是模糊或无穷的。而是不能超越完美的完整性。在这方面，上帝是“最奇异的”（107-9）。第五章将最终差异与非最终差异进行了对比，提出了一种新的，非对立且正差异的划分模型。斯科特斯再次使用并加深了亚里斯多德，并“连根拔起了紫杉树”（124）。在第6章中，该研究为个体有限的奇异性奠定了最基本的基础：个体的“与众不同”是一种完美。一旦人们排除了重要的事物，事故，数量，实际存在以及双重否定（“非非x”）作为个体化因素，剩下的便是单纯性。个人的闹剧是决定物种真实性的一种行为。在他的论据中，LaZella惊讶地得出结论，作为纯洁的决心，狂暴是一种质素（如何），而不是乌贼（什么），即形式上的确定。但是，通过使差异化而不是“收缩”，我担心错觉失去了Scotus赋予它的积极方面，并揭示了每个“裸奇异”存在的核心。

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