Reviewed by:

• Self-Love, Egoism, and the Selfish Hypothesis: Key Debates in Eighteenth-Century British Moral Philosophy by Christian Maurer
• Aaron Garrett

Self-love was a pivotal topic of debate for moral philosophers in the first half of the eighteenth century. But, as was also the case for related concepts like sociability and virtue, philosophers meant many different things by ‘self-love.’ The historians of philosophy who discuss self-love often do as well. A great virtue of Christian Maurer’s Self-Love, Egoism, and the Selfish Hypothesis is to disambiguate five senses of self-love in eighteenth-century discussions. ‘Self-love’ and its synonyms variously refer to (1) egoistic desire, (2) love of praise, (3) self-esteem, (4) amour propre, and (5) self-respect. Maurer uses these ideal types forensically to provide a better understanding of what is being debated by whom and why.

Maurer has chapters on a number of British authors familiar to historians of philosophy— Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Smith, and Hume—and discusses the debate from its period of great liveliness to the gradual ebbing of its importance. He also includes chapters on some less discussed figures, Mandeville and Archibald Campbell, and brief sections on Alexander Forbes, Benjamin Tucker, John Gay, and David Hartley. A virtue of the study is how Maurer complicates the positions of familiar authors by showing how less familiar authors occupy positions that challenge assumptions about self-love. For example, like Mikko Tolonen (Mandeville and Hume: Anatomists of Civil Society [Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2013]), Maurer argues that Mandeville places less importance on self-love (“egoistic desire,” in Maurer’s terms) than self-liking (or amour propre). The focus on amour propre puts Mandeville in the tradition of Pierre Nicole and the Augustinian deflation of human pride after the fall. This explains why Mandeville was so harsh to Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury optimistically projected a false natural virtue onto a fallen world. This had to be debunked for a properly anatomical theory to show that the true sources were not in natural virtue but in self-liking.

By focusing on the difference between self-love and self-liking, Maurer can clearly distinguish Mandeville’s “selfish” theory from Campbell’s account of self-love as egoistic desire and self-esteem. Campbell shared comparatively little Augustinian pessimism with Mandeville, although both are philosophers of self-love. Maurer also documents that Hutcheson himself, like Shaftesbury, had a role for self-love as Stoic self-cultivation in his moral psychology, although I am skeptical that it is properly moral for Hutcheson and not just a natural motivation in us giving rise to properly moral sentiments. The contrast between Campbell, Mandeville, and Hutcheson shows that the varieties of self-love combine with other commitments in ways we might not at first expect. For example, Campbell, like Hutcheson, affirms natural sociability but on the different grounds of egoistic desire, since, unlike Mandeville, he is not advocating amour propre. Rational egoism also allows Campbell, like Butler and unlike Hutcheson, to avoid taking morality as an automatic sentimental response to approved qualities.

Butler was a great influence on the next generations of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers (and as Maurer points out, on Hutcheson’s later writings) and provided an [End Page 150] influential and satisfying solution to the conflicts between senses of self-love by arguing for the hierarchical role of self-love in the governing of first-order principles. However, Butler drew on quite different philosophical sources than many of these other authors: less Shaftesbury and Mandeville than Samuel Clarke, equity law, Anglican divines, and Aristotle. Indeed self-respect, which Maurer uses to characterize his variant on self-love, is (as Maurer notes) very similar to Aristotle’s philautia. This makes him a somewhat difficult fit within a conversation primarily focused on Augustinianism and anti-Augustinianism.

I do wonder whether what Maurer labels as Butler’s distinctive approach to self-love as self-respect is not rather properly directed second-order egoistic desire, that is, egoistic desire and self-esteem informed by adequate self-knowledge...

审核人：

• 自我爱，利己主义和自私假说：克里斯蒂安·莫雷尔（Christian Maurer）在18世纪英国道德哲学中的主要争论
• 亚伦·加勒特（Aaron Garrett）

在18世纪上半叶，自爱是道德哲学家辩论的关键话题。但是，与诸如社交性和美德等相关概念一样，哲学家通过“自爱”来表达许多不同的含义。讨论自爱的哲学史家也经常这样做。克里斯汀·莫雷尔（Chris Maurer）的“自我爱”，“利己主义”和“自私假说”的一大优点是，在18世纪的讨论中消除了五种自我爱的感觉。“自爱”及其同义词不同地指（1）利己欲望；（2）对赞美的热爱；（3）自尊；（4）自以为是；（5）自尊。毛勒（Maurer）在法医上运用了这些理想类型，以更好地了解谁和为什么在争论什么。

毛勒（Maurer）着有几章讲述了哲学史学家沙夫茨伯里（Shaftesbury），哈奇森（Hutcheson），巴特勒（Butler），史密斯（Smith）和休ume（Hume）等英国历史学家所熟悉的文章，并讨论了从活跃时期到重要性逐渐减弱的辩论。他还包括有关较少讨论的人物，曼德维尔和阿奇博尔德·坎贝尔的章节，以及有关亚历山大·福布斯，本杰明·塔克，约翰·盖伊和大卫·哈特利的简要章节。这项研究的优势在于，毛勒如何通过展示不那么熟悉的作者所占据的位置挑战自我假设的方式来使熟悉的作者的位置复杂化。例如，像Mikko Tolonen（曼德维尔和休姆：民间社会的解剖学家[牛津：伏尔泰基金会，2013年]，毛勒（Maurer）认为，曼德维尔（Mandeville）对自我爱（用毛勒（Maurer的话说，“自私的欲望”）的重视程度不如自爱（或自以为是）。专注于私欲，使曼德维尔成为了皮埃尔·尼科尔（Pierre Nicole）的传统，并在堕落之后使奥古斯丁式的人类自尊心放缩。这解释了为什么曼德维尔对沙夫茨伯里如此苛刻。沙夫茨伯里乐观地将虚假的自然美德投射到堕落的世界上。对于正确的解剖学理论，这必须被揭穿，以表明真正的来源不是天生的美德，而是自欺欺人。

通过关注自我爱与自我喜欢之间的差异，毛勒可以清楚地将曼德维尔的“自私”理论与坎贝尔对自我爱的自我主义欲望和自尊的描述区分开。坎贝尔与曼德维尔相比，对奥古斯丁的悲观主义相对较少，尽管他们都是自爱的哲学家。毛勒还记录说，像沙夫茨伯里一样，哈奇森本人在道德心理学中也像斯多葛自我修养一样扮演着自我爱的角色，尽管我对此表示怀疑，这对哈奇森来说是正确的，而不仅仅是我们自然而然地促使自己正确地发展的动机。道德情感。坎贝尔（Campbell），曼德维尔（Mandeville）和哈钦森（Hutcheson）之间的对比表明，自爱的多样性与其他承诺以我们最初可能不会想到的方式结合在一起。例如，坎贝尔（Hampcheson）和哈奇森（Hutcheson）他肯定了自然的社交能力，但出于利己主义的不同理由，因为他不像曼德维尔那样提倡私欲。理性的利己主义也使坎贝尔（如巴特勒和哈奇森不同）可以避免将道德视为对认可品质的自动感性回应。

巴特勒对苏格兰启蒙哲学家的下一代产生了巨大的影响（正如毛勒所指出的那样，在哈奇森的后来著作中），并通过争论“自我爱”之间的冲突，提供了[End Page 150]有影响力的令人满意的解决方案。在一级原则的管理中自我爱的等级角色。但是，巴特勒在哲学来源上与其他许多作者截然不同：沙夫茨伯里和曼德维尔比塞缪尔·克拉克少，权益法，英国国教神学家和亚里斯多德少。的确，毛勒（Maurer）用自我尊重来刻画他的自恋变体，正如毛勒所指出的那样，它与亚里士多德（Aristotle）的菲洛蒂亚（philautia）非常相似。。这使他在主要集中于奥古斯丁主义和反奥古斯丁主义的对话中显得有些困难。

我确实想知道毛勒（Maurer）所说的巴特勒（Barler）对待自爱作为自尊的独特方法是不是正确地指向了二阶利己主义的欲望，即充分的自我知识所告知的利己主义的欲望和自尊...