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• Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Summer 1882–Winter 1883/84) by Friedrich Nietzsche
• Paul Bishop

Begun by Ernst Behler and Bernd Magnus, and now under the editorial direction of Alan D. Schrift and Duncan Large, Stanford University Press’s ambitious project to offer in nineteen volumes a complete translation of the fifteen-volume Kritische Studienausgabe of Nietzsche’s works is proceeding apace. Volume 14 corresponds to volume 10 of the KSA and, while its first fragment demonstrates the need for its helpful editorial apparatus to make sense of these texts, its second raises more general questions about translation (and, in this case, how to translate the pronoun man). These questions are discussed at some length in the “Translators’ Afterword” provided by Paul S. Loeb and David F. Tinsley.

In a section entitled “Our Philosophy of Language,” Loeb and Tinsley note that their own approach has much in common with that of R. Kevin Hill and Michael A. Scarpitti in their “Note on the Text and Translation” included in their recent translation of the material known as The Will to Power (London: Penguin Books, 2017), and they quote approvingly Clancy Martin’s summary of the challenges facing the translation of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra in particular. As Loeb and Tinsley observe, the very term ‘translate’ and its German equivalents, übersetzen and übertragen, connote a sense of “carrying something over or across a barrier or divider”—in this context, across “the vast ocean” separating Nietzsche’s nineteenth-century German and twenty-first-century American English (724).

In part, navigating this ocean involves attention to the historical context of Nietzsche’s language and the concomitant need to reimagine the science, technology, and fashion of the nineteenth century; in part, it involves tackling problems faced by any translator of German, including that tricky third-person singular universal pronoun man. Rather than following Walter Kaufmann’s preference for the singular universal third-person English pronoun ‘one,’ Loeb and Tinsley substitute the pronominal plural universal ‘we’ (along with its possessive determiner ‘our’ for sein) (726). And their solutions to such problems as inflection, modal particles, and singular universals are equally pragmatic. In fact, Loeb and Tinsley provide a short glossary that summarizes their choices of some important terms in Zarathustra, including Empfindung (best captured in the sense Nietzsche most often uses it as “feeling,” but in a cognitive sense rendered as “perception” or “sensation”); Gemüth (a term undergoing a transition in Nietzsche’s time from designating the home of all mental faculties to its more narrow sense of the faculty of feeling and perception); and höhere Menschen / kleine Menschen (translated respectively as “superior” and “puny” human beings).

Which brings us to the biggest and, of course, the most difficult challenge—how to translate not just Mensch but Übermensch? Loeb and Tinsley confess that, up until twenty years ago, their preferred translation of Mensch would have been the equivalent designation “man” with the possessive determiner “his,” yet they realize that English usage nowadays requires it be rendered in its nongendered form as “human” or “human being” (749). Within the etymology of Übermensch and its variants, its adjectival and adverbial form übermenschlich predominates, beginning in the sixteenth century with the theologian Wendelin Steinbach, while by Nietzsche’s time it had become the standard term to describe powers or abilities exceeding human capability (750). In fact, Loeb and Tinsley distinguish three different ways in which Nietzsche uses the philosophical concept of superhumans, which they call the supernatural, superior-individual, and superior-species uses (757).

Critical of the suggestion that the term has Goethean connotations, either as an echo of the famous “Study” scene of Faust (771), or in Carlyle’s sense in recognizing Goethe in On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841) as one of the “Great Men” (767–69), Loeb and Tinsley claim that Nietzsche intended his new Zarathustrian concept as “a...

审核人：

• 弗里德里希·尼采（Friedrich Nietzsche ）这样的辐照Zarathustra时期（1882年夏季至1883/84冬季）未出版的片段
• 保罗·毕晓普

斯坦福大学出版社的雄心勃勃的项目由恩斯特·贝勒（Ernst Behler）和伯纳德·马格努斯（Bernd Magnus）共同发起，现在由艾伦·D·施里夫特（Alan D. Schrift）和邓肯·拉格（Duncan Large）担任编辑指导。该书计划将尼采的15卷《尼罗河的著作》完整译成中文，正在迅速进行。第14卷对应于KSA的第10卷，虽然其第一部分说明了其有用的编辑工具才能理解这些文本的必要性，但其第二部分提出了有关翻译（以及在此情况下如何翻译代词）的更一般性的问题。男人）。Paul S. Loeb和David F. Tinsley在“译者的后记”中对这些问题进行了详细讨论。

勒布（Leeb）和廷斯利（Tinsley）在题为“我们的语言哲学”的部分中指出，他们自己的方法与R.凯文·希尔（R. Kevin Hill）和迈克尔·斯卡皮蒂（Michael A. Scarpitti）在其最新译本中的“文字和翻译说明”中有很多共同点。被称为材料的权力意志（伦敦：企鹅出版社，2017年），他们引用赞许面临尼采的翻译挑战克兰西马丁的总结查拉图斯特拉尤其如此。由于勒布和廷斯利观察，这个术语“翻译”和它的德国当量，übersetzen和übertragen，意味着一种“在障碍物或分隔物之上或之上穿越某物的感觉” —在这种情况下，跨越尼采的19世纪德国德语和21世纪美国英语（724）的“广阔海洋”。

在部分海洋中航行需要关注尼采语言的历史背景以及随之而来的重塑19世纪科学，技术和时尚的需求；在某种程度上，它涉及解决任何德语翻译人员所面临的问题，包括棘手的第三人称单数通用代词人。而不是遵循沃尔特·考夫曼对奇异通用的第三人称代词英语偏好“之一，”勒布和廷斯利替代代词复数普遍“我们”（连同其所有格限定“我们”的盛）（726）。他们对诸如拐点，模态粒子和奇异普遍性等问题的解决方案同样是实用的。实际上，勒布（Leeb）和廷斯利（Tinsley）提供了一个简短的词汇表，总结了他们在Zarathustra中一些重要术语的选择，其中包括Empfindung（在尼采最常用的术语中，尼采最常将其用作“感觉”，但在认知意义上则表示为“感知”或“感知”）。 “感觉”）; 格姆特（Gemüth）（这个名词在尼采时代从指定所有精神科系的住所过渡到其对感觉和知觉系的狭义感）。和höhereMenschen / kleine Menschen（分别翻译为“上等”和“微弱”的人）。

这给我们带来最大的，当然，最困难的挑战，如何才能不只是翻译曼希但超人？勒布（Leeb）和廷斯利（Tinsley）承认，直到20年前，他们首选的Mensch译本都是等同于“占有者”的“ man”，但他们意识到如今的英语用法要求将其以非性别形式呈现。 “人类”或“人类”（749）。在Übermensch及其变体的词源中，其形容词和副词形式übermenschlich从16世纪开始，神学家温德林·斯坦巴赫（Wendelin Steinbach）成为主流，而到尼采时代，它已成为描述超越人类能力的能力的标准术语（750）。实际上，勒布和廷斯利区分了尼采使用超人的哲学概念的三种不同方式，他们称其为超自然的，超个人的和超物种的使用（757）。

批评该术语具有哥特式含义的暗示，是对著名的《浮士德》（“浮士德”）研究场景的回应（771年），或者在凯雷的意义上承认《歌颂英雄》，《英雄崇拜》和《历史英雄》（1841年）中的歌德。）作为“伟大人物”（767-69年）中的一员，勒布和廷斯利声称尼采将他的新的萨拉索斯德式思想构想为“ ...