Reviewed by:

• Moral Psychology with Nietzsche by Brian Leiter
• Paul S. Loeb

Brian Leiter’s second book on Nietzsche brings together ideas and arguments that have already had a significant influence on the field through their earlier formulations in his articles from the past two decades. It is thus indispensable reading for anyone interested in Leiter’s evolving project of showing that Nietzsche has the correct naturalistic approach to issues in moral philosophy and moral psychology. As usual with Leiter’s scholarship, this monograph is extremely clear, densely argued, and philosophically sophisticated.

Leiter nicely frames this book with an introduction in which he offers his latest thoughts on Nietzsche’s naturalistic approach and with a concluding chapter in which he joins Joshua Knobe to make a strong argument that contemporary human sciences favor Nietzsche’s picture of human moral psychology over those offered by the rival Aristotelian and Kantian traditions. In between, Leiter divides his book into two parts where he revisits his first book’s discussions about Nietzsche’s arguments against moral realism (part 1) and against free will (part 2). Here, however, he adds a lot of compelling new material that takes into account the intervening explosion of interest in Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology. Due to length restrictions, I will just raise a few questions about Leiter’s central claim that Nietzsche’s naturalistic approach leads him to be “an anti-realist about value, including his own” (65).

As in his first book, Leiter argues for a “methodological” interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism, meaning that Nietzsche thinks his positions “must answer to the facts as they unfold in the course of systematic empirical inquiry” (9). But here he broaches an important criticism of this interpretation: “Nietzsche seems to have been right about much of human moral psychology notwithstanding his failure to employ any of the methods of the empirical psychology that has confirmed much of his work. What kind of methodological naturalism is that?” (10, Leiter’s emphasis). In response, Leiter reiterates his claim that Nietzsche was a “speculative” methodological naturalist, as he had to be, “given the primitive state of psychology in the nineteenth century” (5). What this means is that Nietzsche’s “genius” showed him how to use unsystematic data and methods—that is, the psychological observations gleaned by himself and other discerning historical figures, as well as his study of contemporaneous psychological research—so as to arrive at hypotheses that are now vindicated by empirical findings and experimental methods in personality and social psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and behavioral genetics (9–11, 82–83, 166).

What is worrying about this response is that Leiter’s black box appeal to Nietzsche’s speculative genius does not seem to be either naturalistic or methodological. Indeed, we usually take it for granted that genius is not replicable. So a better option might be to look somewhere less anachronistic and more exegetically grounded for Nietzsche’s understanding of philosophical naturalism. Section 109 of The Gay Science seems a plausible choice, because here Nietzsche explicitly proposes a replicable methodological program that does not depend on his own genius and does not have to await confirmation by [End Page 160] future science. The goal, he says, is to purify our conception of nature of any falsifying anthropomorphic admixture—including especially all values—and then to translate our human psychology back into this purified conception (see also KSA 9:11[211]).

I think this suggestion, that Nietzsche proposed a systematic correction of the enormous “projective error” involved in value realism (29), is a better interpretation of his argument against moral realism than the one offered by Leiter. In a shift from his first book, Leiter now claims that this is not so much an argument from disagreement in moral attitudes but rather from the intractable disagreement recorded throughout the history of moral philosophy (29–30). According to Leiter, Nietzsche thinks that the best (i.e. naturalistic) explanation for this disagreement (23) appeals to natural facts about human beings (i.e. psycho-physiological and social facts) and does not need to make any reference...

审核人：

• 尼采的道德心理学，布莱恩·莱特（Brian Leiter）
• 保罗·莱布（Paul S.Loeb）

布莱恩·莱特（Brian Leiter）撰写的有关尼采的第二本书汇集了一些思想和论点，这些思想和论点通过过去二十年来他在其文章中的早期提法已经对这一领域产生了重大影响。因此，对于对莱特不断发展的项目感兴趣的人来说，这是必不可少的读物，它表明尼采对道德哲学和道德心理学问题具有正确的自然主义态度。与莱特的奖学金一样，这本专着极为清晰，论据密集且哲学精巧。

莱特在本书的开头很好地介绍了他对尼采的自然主义方法的最新思想，并在最后一章中与约书亚·诺贝一起发表了有力的论据，坚称现代人类科学偏爱尼采对人类道德心理学的描述，而不是尼采对人类道德心理学的描述。敌对的亚里士多德和康德传统。在这两者之间，雷特将他的书分为两部分，在那儿，他回顾了第一本书关于尼采反对道德现实主义（第1部分）和反对自由意志（第2部分）的论点的讨论。但是，在这里，他添加了许多引人注目的新材料，其中考虑了对尼采哲学心理学的兴趣激增。由于篇幅限制，

就像在他的第一本书中一样，雷特主张对尼采的哲学自然主义进行“方法论”解释，这意味着尼采认为他的立场“必须对事实进行系统的实证性研究”（9）。但是在这里，他对这种解释提出了重要的批评：“尼采似乎在人类道德心理学的许多方面都是正确的，尽管他未能采用证实了他大部分工作的任何经验心理学方法。什么样的方法论那是自然主义吗？” （10，Leiter的强调）。作为回应，莱特重申了自己的主张，即尼采是“一种投机的”方法论博物学家，正如他所必须的那样，“赋予了十九世纪原始的心理学状态”（5）。这意味着尼采的“天才”向他展示了如何使用非系统的数据和方法（即，他本人和其他敏锐的历史人物搜集到的心理观察结果以及他对同期心理研究的研究），从而得出了假设。个性和社会心理学，认知科学，神经科学和行为遗传学的经验发现和实验方法证明了这些观点（9-11、82-83、166）。

令人担忧的是，莱特对尼采的投机天才的黑匣子吸引力似乎既不是自然主义的，也不是方法论的。确实，我们通常认为天才是不可复制的，这是理所当然的。因此，一个更好的选择可能是，将某处看起来不合时宜，而将更多的精力放在尼采对哲学自然主义的理解上。《同性恋科学》第109节似乎是一个合理的选择，因为尼采在此明确提出了一种可复制的方法学程序，该程序不依赖于他自己的天才，也不必等待[End Page 160]未来科学的证实。他说，目标是要净化我们对任何伪造拟人化混合物（尤其是所有价值）的性质的概念然后将我们的人类心理转化为这种纯净的概念（另请参见KSA 9:11 [211]）。

我认为，尼采提出对价值现实主义所涉及的巨大“投射错误”进行系统纠正的这一建议（29），比莱特提出的对道德现实主义论点的更好解释。从第一本书的转变来看，莱特现在主张，这与其说是道德观念上的分歧，不如说是整个道德哲学史上记录的顽固分歧的论点（29-30）。莱特认为，尼采认为，对这一分歧的最好的（即自然主义的）解释（23）吸引了关于人类的自然事实（即心理，生理和社会事实），因此无需作任何参考...