Reviewed by:

• Jeffersonians in Power: The Rhetoric of Opposition Meets the Realities of Governing ed. by Joanne B. Freeman and Johann N. Neem
• Andrew Shankman

Peter S. Onuf, an eminent scholar of the early American republic and Thomas Jefferson, richly deserves this Festschrift. The contributors to Jeffersonians in Power: The Rhetoric of Opposition Meets the Realities of Governing consider the ideology of Jefferson and his supporters and investigate what happens to ideas when they are put into practice. How and why the ideas change are questions this collection asks of Jefferson and the party he led from opposition to power.

Editors Joanne B. Freeman and Johann N. Neem know that by depicting a sharp transition from opposition to power, they are contributing to a venerable historiographical preoccupation in which Jefferson and his party have not fared well. Beginning most prominently with Henry Adams, scholars have depicted the Jeffersonians as hypocrites who once in power out-Federalized the Federalists. The editors seek “a middle ground” by exploring “the meeting place of ideology and policy,” to reveal that “what appears to be hypocrisy”—asserting national authority, relying on public debt, waging war, rechartering the Bank of the United States—“was in fact a process of discovery and definition” (pp. 2, 10). This discovery led the Jeffersonians to become less naive when they confronted, as the Federalists had in the 1790s, the “realities of governing” (p. 5). For in the 1790s, the editors state in the book’s first sentence, the Jeffersonians “were the party of ‘no’” (p. 1).

The editors are less transcending a limited historiographical construct than they are adding to it more thoughtfully. There are unspoken (possibly unrealized) assumptions informing the subtitle “The Rhetoric of Opposition Meets the Realities of Governing.” With enormous respect for Freeman and Neem, I think these assumptions might be improved if ideals and challenges informed the book’s organizing premise rather than rhetoric and realities.

The essays by John A. Ragosta and Mark Smith remind us that during the 1790s, the Jeffersonians were far from being merely the party of no. These essays suggest that the best way to anticipate what the Jeffersonians did after 1800 is to understand what they said in the 1790s. Most of what the Jeffersonians did in power was not a “paradox,” a term relied on in the introduction and later in the volume (p. 2). The Jeffersonians made clear in the 1790s that they always wanted a certain kind of active nation-state, a certain kind of global commercial order, and hoped to wield power to achieve this vision. To a remarkable degree, the Jeffersonians pursued these goals when they got the chance.

Smith’s essay contributes to scholarship that shows that the Jeffersonians, when denouncing the Federalists, offered an alternative domestic and global political and commercial order. Beginning in the 1790s, James Madison demanded commercial discrimination, which required powerful market intervention by the national government. The Jeffersonians wanted to upend a [End Page 115] global commercial order dominated by Britain, a legacy of imperial supremacy that they feared was fatal to republican institutions. Upending it would challenge the culture of monarchy, or, as Madison described it, “‘the genius of Monarchy’” (p. 85). Jeffersonians feared that monarchy was not an antiquated institution. Rather, at its most potent and effective it harnessed modern instruments such as public debt, national banks, stock markets, and global commerce to concentrate and consolidate power. Policies that consolidated authority over debt, banks, and commerce were key indicators of this culture of monarchy.

Smith shows that in opposing the Bank of the United States, the Neutrality Proclamation, and the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Jeffersonians denounced Federalist policies that they believed exemplified the culture of monarchy. Yet they did not oppose all banks, only a massive bank connected to the national government. They also opposed public debt serviced to concentrate ownership and to connect public creditors to that government in perpetuity, but not all...

审核人：

• 杰斐逊执政：反对的修辞与执政的现实相吻合。乔安妮·弗里曼（Joanne B.Freeman）和约翰·尼姆（Johann N.Neem）
• 安德鲁·尚克曼

彼得·奥努夫（Peter S. Onuf）是美国早期共和国的著名学者，而托马斯·杰斐逊（Thomas Jefferson）则应得此节日。杰斐逊执政的贡献者：反对派修辞与执政现实相结合，考虑杰斐逊及其支持者的意识形态，并研究将思想付诸实践时会发生什么。这个观念如何以及为什么会改变，这是这个系列对杰斐逊和他从反对权力领导的政党提出的问题。

编辑乔安妮·弗里曼（Joanne B. Freeman）和约翰·尼姆（Johann N. Neem）知道，通过描绘从反对派到权力的急剧转变，他们为杰斐逊和他的政党表现不佳的历史上的历史重心做出了贡献。从亨利·亚当斯（Henry Adams）最显着地开始，学者将杰斐逊主义者描述为伪君子，他们一度掌权使联邦主义者联邦化。编辑们通过探索“意识形态和政策的交汇处”来寻求“中间立场”，以揭示“似乎伪善的事物”-主张国家权威，依靠公共债务，发动战争，向美国银行收费“实际上是一个发现和定义的过程”（第2、10页）。这一发现使杰斐逊主义者在面对联邦政府在1790年代所面临的“执政现实”时变得天真了（第5页）。

编辑者没有超越有限的历史构架，而比他们更深思熟虑地增加了历史构架。有一些不言而喻的（可能是未实现的）假设通知副标题“反对派的修辞与执政的现实相遇。” 出于对Freeman和Neem的高度重视，我认为，如果理想和挑战能够为本书的组织前提而不是言辞和现实提供依据，那么这些假设可能会得到改善。

约翰·拉格斯塔（John A. Ragosta）和马克·史密斯（Mark Smith）的论文提醒我们，在1790年代，杰斐逊主义者远非仅仅是没有党派。这些文章表明，预测杰斐逊主义者在1800年以后所做的事情的最好方法是了解他们在1790年代所说的话。杰斐逊主义者执政的大部分过程都不是“悖论”，这是引言和后来的卷中所依赖的术语（第2页）。杰斐逊主义者在1790年代明确表示，他们一直想要某种活跃的民族国家，某种全球商业秩序，并希望运用力量来实现这一愿景。杰斐逊主义者在有机会的情况下追求了这些目标。

史密斯（Smith）的论文对学术贡献很大，表明杰斐逊主义者在谴责联邦主义者时，提供了替代性的国内和全球政治和商业秩序。从1790年代开始，詹姆斯·麦迪逊（James Madison）要求进行商业歧视，这需要中央政府进行有力的市场干预。杰斐逊主义者想颠覆[End Page 115]全球商业秩序以英国为主导，这是帝国主义至高无上的遗产，他们担心这对共和制机构具有致命性。颠覆它会挑战君主制的文化，或者正如麦迪逊所描述的那样，挑战“君主制的天才”（p。85）。杰斐逊主义者担心君主制不是一个过时的机构。相反，它以最有力和最有效的方式利用了公共债务，国家银行，股票市场和全球商业等现代工具来集中和巩固权力。巩固对债务，银行和商业的权威的政策是这种君主制文化的关键指标。

史密斯（Smith）表明，杰斐逊主义者反对美国银行，《中立宣言》以及《外国人和煽动法》，谴责他们认为是君主制文化的联邦主义政策。然而，他们并不反对所有银行，而只是反对与中央政府建立联系的大型银行。他们还反对为集中所有权和将公共债权人永久地与该政府联系而偿还的公共债务，但并非全部...