Abstract:

This paper assesses Hume's theory of belief by considering a puzzle about the nature of counterfeit belief. Counterfeit beliefs include states brought on by poetry, which possess the same phenomenological properties as beliefs but still fail to count as beliefs (T 1.3.10.10; SBN 630–31). I argue that a dispositional interpretation can give an account of the difference between belief and counterfeit belief, but most common versions of the occurrent state view cannot. Nonetheless, I argue that the occurrent state view can be revised to accommodate the problem of counterfeit belief. On my version of the occurrent state interpretation, beliefs are lively ideas—that is, occurrent states—that are related to a present impression in an appropriate way. Because counterfeit beliefs are not appropriately related to a present impression, they do not count as beliefs.

摘要：

本文通过考虑关于假冒信仰性质的困惑来评估休ume的信仰理论。伪造的信仰包括诗歌带来的国家，这些国家具有与信仰相同的现象学特性，但仍不能算作信仰（T 1.3.10.10； SBN 630-31）。我认为，性格上的解释可以说明信仰和假冒信仰之间的区别，但是现存状态视图的大多数常见版本却不能。尽管如此，我认为可以修改发生状态的观点，以适应假冒信仰的问题。在我对发生状态的解释中，信念是活泼的想法（即发生状态），它们以适当的方式与当前印象相关。由于假冒信仰与当前印象没有适当关系，