Abstract:

The standard interpretation of the impression of will takes Hume to advance two substantive claims about the experience of willing an act. The first claim holds that this experience is readily introspectible; the second that this experience is strictly antecedent to the performance of an act. This interpretation has rendered the impression of will vulnerable to two lines of criticism. One problem is introspective. We are not normally aware of a distinct experience of willing an act. Another problem is temporal. It is odd to think that the experience of volition is something that occurs in its entirety prior to the performance of an act. I argue that the standard interpretation, which burdens Hume with an implausible view of the experience of willing an act, imports claims for which there is insuffcient textual evidence and which are not required by his theoretical commitments.

摘要：

休the印象的标准解释使休ume提出了两个关于意愿行为经验的实质性主张。第一个主张认为这种经历是很容易反思的。第二，这种经验是行为的严格执行的前提。这种解释使意志印象容易受到两种批评。一个问题是内省。我们通常不知道愿意做某事的独特经历。另一个问题是暂时的。奇怪的是，意志的体验是在行为执行之前整体发生的。我认为标准的解释给休ume带来了难以接受的意愿行为体验的难以理解的观点，