Reviewed by:

• Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action by Constantine Sandis
• Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

In Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action, Constantine Sandis takes Hume's empiricist tenet that all meaningful ideas copy impressions as the key to understanding his general philosophy. Sandis then applies "the Copy Principle" to Hume's view of persons and their actions. Portraying Hume's approach (at least in the Treatise) as one of conceptual revision, the result, Sandis says, is that our ideas of persons, reasons, causality, agency, free will, and other related concepts have ordinary meanings (not the abstruse philosophical ones) without ontological implications. The author describes his book as a series of connected essays. The chapters work together to present an anti-metaphysical, naturalistic, and nonskeptical picture of Hume's action theory. Each chapter is readable and trim, but the book covers a great deal of territory in a short space. At times, I craved more detailed arguments and help understanding the views in Sandis's original portrait of Hume. However, both Hume scholars and action theorists will surely find this book thought-provoking and worth grappling with. A brief epilogue discusses how Hume's "soft revisionism" bears on contemporary discussions of agency and action.

Sandis takes Hume's project to be one of establishing what we ordinarily mean in using the terms that stand for problematic concepts like necessity and self. It is not a project of determining what we can properly mean, since expressions just have meanings; they are neither correct nor incorrect. (There are echoes of Wittgenstein throughout the book, and Sandis invokes him explicitly in Hume's [End Page 139] defense in chapter 3, "Necessity, Power, and Freedom.") Furthermore, Hume's is not a project of investigating the ontology of causation, agency, and so on.

Consequently, Sandis suggests, debates, such as the "new Hume" debate, which revolve around questions like whether Hume was a realist, anti-realist, quasi-realist, or skeptical realist, are misguided. Causation involves the idea of necessary connection, of which we have no impression. So, Sandis argues, since we cannot meaningfully say anything about necessary connection, we have no idea to project onto the world and nothing to affrm or to deny. "Hume's conceptual revisionism about necessity thus tempers both skepticism and metaphysical realism in a move made routinely [by Hume] in relation to every major philosophical controversy of his day" (47). In much of the book, Sandis applies this revisionist interpretation of Hume to topics of free will, substance, self, identity, and motivation and morality.

At the heart of Sandis's reading of Hume's action theory is the notion of agency, which is rarely emphasized in analyses of Hume. Sandis develops this conception of agency, first, via discussion of necessity and freedom. Necessitation of action and liberty are easily compatible because of the way Hume defines each within his practice of conceptual reform. He describes cause in terms of constant conjunction of experiences, and necessity in terms of human expectation. Liberty, in his terms, is the ability to do as we will (desire), not the capacity to do anything regardless of the will. Thus, I am free when my motives are regularly conjoined with actions such that observers can predict certain behaviors on my part. Second, agency is tied to the self (mind) and personal identity. In the case of self (and substance), we have no idea of it apart from the ideas of varying qualities; the notion of an uninterrupted self or substance over time is a fiction. However, Sandis argues, Hume offers revised ideas of the self, of substance, and of identity, which follow from Hume's own "theory of meaning" (69). I cannot trace all the twists Hume's discussion of personal identity takes, but in the end, Sandis thinks it "allows us to talk of 'self' and 'identity' in a way that requires nothing beyond the sort of casual observations that he allows for across all his works" (69)—simply as qualities we suppose are tightly connected by relations of contiguity and...

审核人：

• 性格与因果：康斯坦丁·桑迪斯的休ume行动哲学
• 伊丽莎白·拉德克利夫（Elizabeth S.Radcliffe）

康斯坦丁·桑迪斯（Constantine Sandis）在《性格与因果关系：休ume的行动哲学》中，采用了休ume的经验主义原则，即所有有意义的想法都将印象复制为理解他的总体哲学的关键。然后，桑迪斯将“复制原则”应用于休ume对人及其行为的看法。描绘休ume的方法（至少在论文中桑迪斯说，作为一种概念上的修改，结果是我们关于人，原因，因果关系，代理，自由意志和其他相关概念的想法具有普通含义（而不是抽象的哲学含义），而没有本体论上的含义。作者将他的书描述为一系列相关的论文。这些章节共同提出了休ume行动理论的反形而上学，自然主义和非怀疑论的图景。每一章都可读易懂，但本书在短时间内涵盖了很多领域。有时，我渴望提出更详细的论据，并帮助理解桑迪斯（Sandis）的休ume（Hume）原始肖像中的观点。但是，休ume学者和行动理论家都一定会发现这本书发人深省并且值得一试。简短的尾声讨论了休ume的“软修正主义”

桑迪斯（Sandis）将休ume（Hume）的项目视为建立我们通常所说的使用诸如必要性和自我之类的问题性概念的术语之一。这不是确定我们可以正确表达什么的计划，因为表达只是具有含义。它们既不正确也不正确。（整本书中都有维特根斯坦的呼应，桑迪斯在休ume的[End 139]辩护第3章“必要性，权力和自由”中明确地援引了他。）此外，休ume并不是研究因果关系本体的项目。 ，代理商等。

因此，桑迪斯建议，围绕诸如休ume是现实主义者，反现实主义者，准现实主义者还是怀疑主义现实主义者之类的问题的辩论，例如“新休ume”辩论，被误导了。因果关系涉及必要联系的概念，对此我们没有任何印象。因此，桑迪斯认为，由于我们无法有意义地谈论必要的联系，因此我们不打算投射到这个世界上，也没有什么可以掩饰或否认的。“休ume关于必要性的概念修正主义因此[休ume]针对他当时的每一次主要哲学争论，惯常地做出了举动，既减轻了怀疑主义，也减轻了形而上学的现实主义。”（47）。在本书的大部分内容中，桑迪斯将休ume的修正主义解释应用于自由意志，实质，自我，身份，

桑迪斯解读休ume的行为理论的核心是代理的概念，在休ume的分析中很少强调代理。桑迪斯首先通过讨论必要性和自由来发展这种代理的概念。由于休ume在他的概念改革实践中定义了每一种行为，因此行动和自由的必要性很容易兼容。他用经验的不断结合来描述原因，而用人类的期望来描述必要性。用他的话说，自由是指我们愿意（渴望）做事的能力，而不是无论意愿如何做任何事情的能力。因此，当我的动机定期与行动结合在一起时，我便会变得自由，以便观察者可以预测我的某些行为。其次，代理与自我（思想）和个人身份息息相关。就自我（和实质）而言，除了质量不同的想法外，我们对它一无所知；随时间推移不间断的自我或物质的概念是虚构的。然而，桑迪斯认为，休ume提供了关于自我，实质和身份的修正观念，这些观念是基于休ume自己的“意义理论”而来的（69）。我无法追踪休ume关于个人身份的讨论所经历的所有曲折，但最终，桑迪斯认为，这“允许我们以一种不需要他随意观察即可的方式谈论'自我'和'身份'。贯穿他的所有作品”（69）—简而言之，由于我们假设的特质是由邻接关系和...之间的紧密联系而来的。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。从休，自己的“意义理论”（69）开始。我无法追踪休ume关于个人身份的讨论所经历的所有曲折，但最终，桑迪斯认为，这“允许我们以一种不需要他随意观察即可的方式谈论'自我'和'身份'。贯穿他的所有作品”（69）—简而言之，由于我们假设的特质是由邻接关系和...之间的紧密联系而来的。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。从休，自己的“意义理论”（69）开始。我无法追踪休ume关于个人身份的讨论所经历的所有曲折，但最终，桑迪斯认为，这“允许我们以一种不需要他随意观察即可的方式谈论'自我'和'身份'。遍及他的所有作品”（69）—简而言之，我们假设的特质是由邻接关系与...之间的紧密联系而来的。