Reviewed by:

• Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology ed. by Philip A. Reed and Rico Vitz
• Angela Calvo de Saavedra

Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology, edited by Philip A. Reed and Rico Vitz, is a collection of 14 essays intended to explore fruitful connections between David Hume's theory of the passions and ethics and contemporary experimental and cognitive psychology. Although recent moral philosophers have become interested in psychological discoveries in order to refine their normative approach to morality by means of a better empirical understanding of the workings of the mind, this trend has been typically developed by Aristotelian scholarship. Hence, the purpose of this volume is to "fill a gap in the literature" by (i) introducing Hume as a powerful interlocutor in the field of moral psychology, and (ii) showing how Hume's science of man remains valid for contemporary debates on topics such as emotions, virtues, sympathy, empathy, and motivation.

The essays focus on a wide range of topics within Hume's moral psychology, but they can be grouped into four central categories as follows: (i) the challenges of the so-called "situationists" to virtue ethics and how Hume's moral theory can respond to them; (ii) the crucial role of sympathy in Hume's ethics and its relationship with empathy; (iii) Hume's account of the passions and contemporary insights on human motivation; (iv) the possibility of the refinement or cultivation of the passions, connected with Hume's suggested therapies. I will first describe the central claim of each essay and then I will turn to a general assessment of the insights and limits of the book taken as a whole.

In the opening essay, "Beyond the 'Disease of the Learned'. Hume on Passional Disorders," Margaret Watkins uses Hume's personal experience with the disease of the learned to explore the relationship between mental illness and vice. Her claim is twofold: first, it is diffcult on Humean principles to "make a firm distinction" between mental illness and vice. Margaret holds that since both concepts involve a disorder in the passions they should be understood as "lying among a wide continuum" (9). Secondly, Hume suggests a therapy of the passions that can be applied in both situations: the movement from delicacy of passion towards delicacy of taste. Although Watkins does not explore the plausibility of Hume's therapeutic suggestion, it might be promising to connect it with the development of art therapy in contemporary clinical psychology.

The next three essays focus on some of the challenges posed by the situationists to normative virtue ethics, and show how Hume's moral psychology can successfully respond to them. Philip Reed, in "Hume on the Rarity of Virtue," addresses the implication for Hume's virtue ethics of recent experimental studies [End Page 143] in social psychology demonstrating that, in general, people do not possess the virtues. Reed's claim, based on a detailed analysis of Hume's texts, is that he is not committed "to the diffusion of virtue" (41). Erin Frykholm's essay, "Spontaneity, Intuition and Humean Virtue" examines the impact on a Humean account of virtue of empirical data indicating that "people do not act reliably virtuously" and that, in our immediate responses to situations, affects and non-conscious workings of the mind play a crucial motivational role (63). Rico Vitz, in "Character, Culture, and Humean Virtue Ethics: Insights from Situationism and Confucianism," takes on the situationist's sceptical view about character traits conceived as "constant, stable, and evaluatively integrated"—called globalism (99)—and persuasively argues that this criticism does not reach Hume's moral philosophy, since Hume is not committed to globalism.

The next 6 essays reflect on Hume's sympathy, its relationship with empathy and its reliability as the foundation of morality. In "Empathy, Altruism and Hume," Katharina Paxman, after a conscientious exploration of the moral limitations typical of people suffering from Autism Spectrum Disorders, suggests that Hume's sympathy, understood as affective empathy, can explain how, lacking cognitive empathy, autists are competent to make sound moral...

审核人：

• 休ume的道德哲学与当代心理学版。菲利普·里德（Philip A. Reed）和里科·维兹（Rico Vitz）
• 安吉拉（Angela Calvo de Saavedra）

休ume的道德哲学与当代心理学菲利普·A·里德（Philip A. Reed）和里科·维茨（Rico Vitz）编辑的14篇论文集，旨在探讨大卫·休ume（David Hume）的激情与伦理理论与当代实验和认知心理学之间的卓有成效的联系。尽管最近的道德哲学家对心理学的发现很感兴趣，以便通过对心智运作的更好的经验理解来完善他们对道德的规范性方法，但是这种趋势通常是由亚里士多德学者所发展的。因此，本卷的目的是通过（i）引入休as作为道德心理学领域的有力对话者，以及（ii）展示休ume的人文科学如何在当代有关以下方面的辩论中仍然有效的“填补文学空白”。主题，例如情感，美德，同情，同理心和动机。

本文着重于休ume的道德心理学中的广泛主题，但它们可以分为以下四个主要类别：（i）所谓的“情境主义者”对美德伦理学的挑战以及休ume的道德理论如何应对他们; （ii）同情在休ume伦理学中的关键作用及其与同情的关系；（iii）休ume对人类动机的激情和当代见解的叙述；（iv）与休ume建议的疗法有关的对激情进行细化或培养的可能性。我将首先描述每篇文章的中心主张，然后再转向对本书整体的见解和局限性的一般评估。

玛格丽特·沃特金斯（Margaret Watkins）在开篇论文“超越'博学的疾病'。休ume关于被动症”中，利用休ume的个人经验与博学的疾病探讨精神疾病与恶习之间的关系。她的主张是双重的：首先，在休曼原则上很难在精神疾病和恶习之间“做出明确的区分”。玛格丽特认为，由于这两个概念都涉及激情的紊乱，因此应将其理解为“躺在广泛的连续体中”（9）。其次，休ume提出了一种可以在两种情况下都适用的激情疗法：从激情的精致到味觉的精致。尽管沃特金斯并未探讨休ume治疗建议的合理性，

接下来的三篇文章集中讨论了情境主义者对规范美德伦理的挑战，并展示了休ume的道德心理学如何成功地应对这些挑战。菲利普·里德（Philip Reed）在“休ume关于德性的休ume”一文中，探讨了休experimental对最近的实验研究的美德伦理学的涵义[End Page 143]在社会心理学中证明，人们通常不具备美德。里德基于对休ume文本的详细分析而提出的主张是，他不致力于“传播美德”（41）。艾琳·弗莱霍姆（Erin Frykholm）的论文“自发性，直觉和谦卑的美德”通过经验数据检验了对谦卑的解释的影响，这些经验数据表明“人们不能可靠地采取良性行动”，并且在我们对情况的立即反应中，会影响和无意识的工作心智起着至关重要的激励作用（63）。里科·维茨（Rico Vitz）在“人物，文化和谦卑的美德伦理学：从情境主义和儒家的见解”中，对情境主义者对被认为是“稳定，稳定和评估地整合”的性格特征持怀疑态度。

接下来的六篇文章反映了休ume的同情，与休养关系的关系以及作为道德基础的可靠性。凯瑟琳娜·帕克斯曼（Katharina Paxman）在“ Empathy，Altruism和Hume”一文中，对自闭症谱系障碍患者典型的道德局限性进行了认真的探索后，提出休ume的同情（被理解为情感同情）可以解释自闭症患者在缺乏认知同情的情况下如何胜任使声音变得道德...