In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

• Barnaby Barratt's Polemics
• Stephen Frosh (bio)

What is Psychoanalysis? 100 Years After Freud's 'Secret Committee.' London: Routledge, 2013, 240 pages. Radical Psychoanalysis: An Essay on Free-associative Praxis. London: Routledge, 2016, 242 pages. Beyond Psychotherapy: On Becoming a (Radical) Psychoanalyst. London: Routledge, 2019, 218 pages.

Who Knows?

According to Barnaby Barratt, psychoanalysis "is the process of breaking-down assumptions. That is, of perpetually being willing to call oneself into question" (2019, p. 50). This is fortunate, because reading his trilogy, one might be forgiven for thinking that being willing to call oneself into question was not the mark of an experienced "radical" psychoanalyst. There is a great deal of certainty in these books. Everyone else is wrong. Most psychoanalysts—sometimes including Freud, especially in his post-1914 metapsychological works—are in fact just "psychoanalysts," the scare quotes being deliberate. Those who talk about psychoanalysis as "a relationship" usually "deteriorate into drivel when asked what sort of dyadic encounter makes this process distinctive" (2013, p. xv). Writers of "undergraduate textbooks in psychology" are "simple minded" (2013, p. 12) whilst little can be found in the "theoretical structures" of relational and intersubjectivist psychoanalysts, despite their "grandiose" claims, "to distinguish their conduct from a sophisticated version of the practices of counseling and coaching" (2013, p. 38). This is all from the opening salvos in the first book, but at least Barratt is consistent. The second volume criticizes pretty well all schools of psychoanalysis (ego [End Page 786] psychological, object relational, Kleinian, Lacanian) for retreating from Freud's radical decentering perception—the famous idea that "the ego is not master in its own house" (Freud, 1917, p.143). The third volume, which is largely a sustained critique of psychotherapy and of psychoanalytic training, concludes with what amounts to a summary of some of his major arguments against his colleagues:

the most powerful and pernicious resistance to psychoanalysis has always come from "psychoanalysts' themselves—not only all the alleged practitioners and wannabe practitioners, but also those who have, ignoring the necessity of free associative praxis, seized upon one aspect of the several theoretical models of the mind that Freud constructed after 1914 and then sought to amplify or modify these metapsychological speculations into their own model for the practice of 'psychoanalytically informed' psychotherapy.

(2019, p.79)

As it happens, though I might be mistaken, Volume 3 seems more moderate than Volume 1, so perhaps some calling-oneselfinto-question (to multiply hyphenations, in a phenomenological kind of way, as Barratt likes to do) has crept in, but this is a matter of degree: Barratt knows the truth of psychoanalysis, and not many other people do.

Some others do, of course; it is impossible to be within a discipline or praxis (praxis being another favored term) without acknowledging some predecessors. Volume 2 is dedicated to André Green and Jean Laplanche, with good reason, especially with regard to Laplanche. Laplanche's notions of decentering and recentering, Copernican and Ptolemaic processes, and the "fundamental anthropological situation" (2016, p. 99) are central to Barratt's argument and usually cited—though his claims to originality suffer somewhat from their absolute dependence on Laplanche's now well-known and cogent critique of Freudian backsliding. But this "leaning-on" Laplanche is to good effect, as it gives Barratt's polemic some grounding in the work of a first-rate philosophically oriented psychoanalyst whose systematic thinking on trauma and otherness is inspiring some of the most productive writing on how psychoanalysis might be deployed [End Page 787] to "radical" ends, both theoretically and politically (Fletcher, 2007). These ideas are of great significance for the field of psychoanalysis and for other areas of social theory—for instance, Judith Butler draws on them effectively in Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). Barratt does a service in developing them as part of his own effort to reconstruct psychoanalysis as he thinks it should be; whether or not they are not actually his ideas may not therefore really matter.

Anyway, spleen over; the turgid and aggressive nature of these texts is my excuse. Instead of taking offense at Barratt's belligerence and his belittling of those with whom he disagrees, it is more useful to look...

中文翻译：

---

巴纳比·巴拉特（Barnaby Barratt）的诗论

代替摘要，这里是内容的简要摘录：

• 巴纳比·巴拉特（Barnaby Barratt）的诗论
• 斯蒂芬·弗罗什（生物）

什么是精神分析？弗洛伊德的“秘密委员会”成立一百周年。伦敦：Routledge，2013年，240页。激进的心理分析：关于自由联想实践的论文。伦敦：Routledge，2016年，242页。超越心理治疗：关于成为（激进的）心理分析家。伦敦：Routledge，2019，218页。

谁知道？

根据巴纳比·巴拉特（Barnaby Barratt）的说法，心理分析“是打破假设的过程。也就是说，永远愿意对自己提出质疑”（2019年，第50页）。这是幸运的，因为读过他的三部曲，可能会因为认为愿意对自己提出质疑而不是经验丰富的“激进”心理分析家的标志而被宽恕。这些书有很多确定性。其他人都错了。实际上，大多数心理分析师（有时包括弗洛伊德，尤其是在他1914年后的元心理学著作中）都只是“心理分析师”，这种恐惧的引用是有意为之的。那些将心理分析称为“一种关系”的人通常“被问到什么样的二元相遇使这一过程与众不同而恶化”（2013年，第十五页）。《[末页786]心理，客体关系，克莱因，拉卡尼语）摆脱了弗洛伊德激进的偏心观念-著名的观念，即“自我不是自己家里的主人”（弗洛伊德，1917年，第143页）。第三卷主要是对心理治疗和精神分析培训的持续批评，最后总结了他对同事的一些主要论点的总结：

对精神分析的最有力和最有害的抵抗力总是来自“精神分析者”本身–不仅是所有所谓的从业人员和想成为实践者的人，而且是那些不顾自由联合实践的必要性而抓住了这些理论模型一方面的人。弗洛伊德（Freud）于1914年之后建立了这种思想，然后试图将这些超心理学的推测放大或修改为他们自己的模型，以进行“心理分析知情”的心理治疗。

（2019，第79页）

碰巧的是，尽管我可能会误会，第3卷似乎比第1卷要适中，所以也许有人在呼唤自己（以象巴拉特喜欢的现象学方法来增加连字符），但是，这是一个程度的问题：Barratt知道心理分析的真相，其他人却很少。

一些其他人当然会；如果不承认某些前辈，就不可能进入某个学科或实践（实践是另一个受欢迎的术语）。第2卷专门针对安德烈·格林（AndréGreen）和让·拉普兰奇（Jean Laplanche），这有充分的理由，尤其是关于拉普兰奇。拉普兰奇的偏心和偏心，哥白尼和托勒密主义的过程以及“基本人类学状况”（2016，第99页）的概念是巴拉特论点的核心，通常被引用-尽管他对独创性的主张在某种程度上受到了他们对拉普兰奇现在井的绝对依赖的绝对依赖。弗洛伊德后退的著名而令人信服的批评。但是这种“靠拢”的拉普兰奇效果很好，因为它使巴拉特[结束页787]在理论上和政治上都达到了“激进”的目的（Fletcher，2007年）。这些想法对精神分析领域和社会理论的其他领域都具有重要意义，例如，朱迪思·巴特勒（Judith Butler）在“给自己做个账”（2005）中有效地利用了它们。巴拉特（Barratt）为发展心理分析服务，这是他自己认为应该重建的精神分析工作的一部分；因此，不管它们是否实际上不是他的想法，都可能无关紧要。

无论如何，健脾结束；这些文字的古怪和侵略性是我的借口。与其对Barratt的好战和对他不同意的人的轻视感到冒犯，反而看起来更有用...