• Cybernetics, Intelligence, and Cosmotechnics
• Bruce Clarke (bio)

What, then, is cybernetics? It would seem, a monster with many heads. In Recursivity and Contingency, Yuk Hui notes that cybernetics is "not really a discipline but rather a movement with enormous richness and heterogeneity of ideas." Hui codifies the diversity of cybernetics in two mirror images capturing how its concept has been split into opposing personae: "One is reductionist: it reduces organisms to feedback systems, which are imitations." This is the image of cybernetics reflected in machine systems that imitate the organic performances of the human mind, the perceptions and senses of the animal nervous system, or other physiological capacities and regularities, by reduction to routines of calculation and prediction. "The other is nonreductionist ... beyond any form of technological determinism; it is open to contingency without only reducing it to calculation."

Catherine Malabou's Morphing Intelligence follows the concept of intelligence and its contingencies through several transformations. Cybernetics here is shorthand for AI engineering programs developing computational architectures aimed at simulating the plasticity of synaptic connections in the brain. In contrast, Recursivity and Contingency submits cybernetics to a massive genealogical reading grounded in German idealism and Naturphilosphie, demonstrating its deepest roots in the "organic condition of philosophizing" since Immanuel Kant, which has developed the concept of the organic in a way that subordinates the phenomenon of technicity to a more general definition of organism. Cybernetics in its nonreductionist unfolding mediates the arrival of a general organology that Hui proposes to fashion into a cosmotechnics fit to counter the current threat of being overtaken by a globalized metastasis of reductionistic systems in the service of capitalist finality.

Developed from the 2015 Wellek Library Lectures at the University of California, Irvine, Catherine Malabou's Morphing Intelligence, a slim and accessible volume, retains the format of the occasion prompting it. Much of it glosses significant figures in two centuries of debates between psychology as an emergent discipline with scientific ambitions to submit notions of intelligence to empirical tests, and philosophy looking on critically as the perennial arbiter of intellect. Malabou begins this history with the development of Wilhelm Wundt's experimental psychology in the schools of Théodule Ribot and Alfred Binet, eventually challenged by Henri Bergson's philosophy of the élan vital. In Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson sets the mold for the "protective shield" by which those modern philosophies most influential in Continental critical theory have guarded the impalpable stuff of intelligence from the material graspings of biology and psychology. This defensive attitude is now obsolete, Malabou argues: "It has no future" in the "cognitive era." Morphing Intelligence maps the ideological resistance to artificial intelligence so that Malabou can reiterate her own conversion, with the arrival the new "cognitive era" of "cybernetic intelligence," to a view that no longer labors to distinguish between organic and computational minds.

The path to be taken in Morphing Intelligence is "the exploration of ... the space between biological and symbolic life." Intelligence is "a border concept found between biological life and symbolic life," that is, "all those dimensions of life that cannot be reduced to .... life." Indeed, in Bergson's formulation, "in this precisely lies the [End Page 12] difficulty—born of life, intelligence turns its back on life, for it 'is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.'" In Bergson's dialectic, intelligence is the negation of life by life. Malabou will rest her discourse of intelligence upon a sort of vitalist monism akin to Bergson's, but then reverse the sign of intelligence: organic life posits intelligence as the vehicle to carry life over to its "cybernetic definition." For, Malabou continues, "It is no longer possible to determine relations between biological and symbolic life without considering the third type of life, which is the simulation of life."

Morphing Intelligence presents three "metamorphoses of intelligence" since the rise of...

• 控制论，情报和宇宙技术
• 布鲁斯·克拉克（生物）

那么，控制论是什么？似乎是一个有很多头的怪物。在递归和偶然性中Yuk Hui指出，控制论不是“实际上是一门学科，而是具有极大丰富性和异质性的运动”。Hui用两幅镜像化了控制论的多样性，以捕捉其概念如何被分解为对立的角色：“一个是还原论者：它将有机体还原为模仿的反馈系统。” 这是控制论的图像，反映在机器系统中，它通过简化计算和预测程序来模仿人脑的有机性能，动物神经系统的感知和感觉或其他生理功能和规律。“另一个是非还原论者……超越了任何形式的技术决定论；它具有偶然性，而不仅仅是将其简化为计算。”

凯瑟琳·马拉布（Catherine Malabou）的“变态智能”（Morphing Intelligence）通过几次转换遵循了智能及其偶然性的概念。这里的控制论是AI工程程序的简写，它开发旨在模拟大脑中突触连接可塑性的计算体系结构。相反，递归性和偶然性使控制论服从于以德国唯心主义和自然哲学为基础的大规模家谱研究展示了自伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）以来“哲学的有机条件”的最深层根源。伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）提出了有机概念，以将技术性现象服从于更广义的有机体定义。控制论在其非还原论的发展中介导了一种普遍的器官学的到来，Hui提议将其转变成一种宇宙技术，以应对当前为资本主义终结性服务而被还原论体系的全球化转移所取代的当前威胁。

凯瑟琳·马拉布（Catherine Malabou）的《变形情报》（Morphing Intelligence）是根据加州大学欧文分校（University of California，Irvine）的2015年Wellek图书馆演讲而编写​​的，它体积小巧且易于访问，并保留了提示形式。在经过两个世纪的辩论之后，心理学作为一门新兴学科具有科学野心，可以将智力观念提交实证检验，而哲学则将其批判为常识性的常年仲裁者，这在很大程度上掩盖了重要人物。Malabou开始这段历史与冯特的实验心理学的忒阿杜勒里博和阿尔弗雷德·比奈，各学校最终由亨利·柏格森哲学挑战的发展生命冲动。在创意进化中（1907），伯格森（Bergson）为“保护盾”树立了榜样，那些在大陆批判理论中最有影响力的现代哲学从生物学和心理学的实质性掌握中保护了无用的智力。马拉布认为，这种防御态度现在已经过时了：在“认知时代”，“它没有未来”。Morphing Intelligence绘制了对人工智能的意识形态抵抗力，以便马拉布可以重申自己的转变，随着新的“网络智能”的“认知时代”的到来，Malabou不再努力区分有机思维和计算思维。

在将要采取的路径变形方法智力是“...的生物和象征生命之间的空间探索。” 智力是“在生物生命和象征性生命之间发现的边界概念”，即“无法还原为……生命的所有生命维度”。确实，在伯格森的表述中，“ [这正是[第12页]的困难所在–生命的诞生，智力将生命抛在了后面，因为它的特点是天生无法理解生活。””在伯格森的辩证法中，智力是生命的否定的生活。马拉布将以类似于伯格森（Bergson）的一元论一元论来阐述其智力论述，但随后扭转了智力的迹象：有机生命将智力假定为将生命延续到其“ cybernetic定义”的工具。因为，马拉布继续说：“如果不考虑第三种生命，那就是模拟生命，就不可能再确定生物生命和象征生命之间的关系了。”

自从……兴起以来，Morphing Intelligence呈现出三种“智力的变态”。