This article argues that the EU’s enlargement negotiations with Eastern European applicants have become possible to a large extent by the introduction of objective assessment by the Commission, which allowed integration to proceed despite the threat of deadlock. The process of negotiations and preparation, however, should be better seen as a constant switching between the technical parts of the acquis and their (potential) political consequences. These arguments are developed in an analysis of Bulgaria’s path to accession. The analysis shows that in the domestic arena, the same tensions between the seemingly technical character of the negotiations and their political implications and consequences can be observed. The article will argue that while the emphasis on objective criteria and technical issues obscured the potential political consequences and effects on various sectors of the economy and society, stalled reforms in public administration or the judiciary belonged to the realm of its unintended consequences. Rule of law did not reform significantly despite the introduction of a special tool of political conditionality, the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (cvm). The politicization of issues changed over time, with some measures affecting political cleavages more than a decade after Bulgaria’s accession.

本文认为，通过委员会引入客观评估，欧盟与东欧申请人的扩大谈判已在很大程度上成为可能，尽管面临僵局的威胁，该评估仍允许进行整合。但是，最好将谈判和准备过程看作是收购的技术部分与其（潜在的）政治后果之间的不断切换。这些论点是在对保加利亚加入世贸组织的路径进行分析后得出的。分析表明，在国内舞台上，可以看到谈判的看似技术性质与其政治影响和后果之间存在同样的紧张关系。本文将辩称，尽管对客观标准和技术问题的强调掩盖了对经济和社会各个部门的潜在政治后果和影响，但公共行政或司法部门的停滞不前的改革属于其意想不到的后果。尽管引入了具有政治条件性的特殊工具，即欧盟的合作与核查机制（cvm）。问题的政治化随着时间的流逝发生了变化，在保加利亚加入后十多年来，一些措施影响了政治分裂。