This article argues that Arendt’s rich account of the political necessarily involves an implicit, but never fully worked out, phenomenological articulation of justice in her work. Arendt’s unique articulation of the role of judgment in political action provides us with the outline of an Arendtian principle of justice that relieves the tension between idealist and realist theories of justice. Building on this role of judgment, I aim to emphasize the phenomenological premise of identifying the conditions for the possibility of the political in empirico-historical events rooted in her ideas of plurality and freedom. By showing that, for Arendt, justice is a phenomenon like power and equality, we can make progress on an implicit account of justice in her work. Taking seriously Arendt’s articulation of freedom-manifesting and principled political action, I will show that a principle of justice guides political action based on political judgment that is affectively oriented to the world.

本文认为，阿伦特对政治的丰富论述必然涉及其工作中隐含但从未完全解决的现象学上对正义的表述。阿伦特对法官在政治行动中的作用的独特阐述为我们提供了阿伦德正义原则的纲要，该原则缓解了理想主义和现实主义正义理论之间的紧张关系。在这种判断作用的基础上，我旨在强调现象学的前提，即确定根源于她的多元化和自由思想的经验历史事件中政治可能性的条件。通过证明，对于阿伦特来说，正义是一种像权力和平等之类的现象，我们可以在她的工作中隐含正义的基础上取得进步。