The doctrine of the pregivenness of the world features prominently in Husserl’s numerous phenomenological analyses and descriptions of the role the world plays in our experience. Properly evaluating its function within the overall system of transcendental phenomenology is, however, by no means a straightforward task, as evidenced by many manuscripts from the 1930s. These detail various epistemological and metaphysical difficulties and potential paradoxes encumbering the notion of the pre-given world. This paper contends that some of these difficulties can be alleviated by revisiting Husserl’s late concept of the earth and, more specifically, disclosing its transcendental function in the constitution of pregivenness. To test this claim, I turn to Husserl’s 1931 manuscript describing the paradox of “the originary acquisition of the world.” I argue that the paradox is dissolved by introducing the transcendental-phenomenological concept of the earth.

在胡塞尔对现象在我们的经验中所扮演的角色进行的众多现象学分析和描述中，突出世界的教义是其主要特征。然而，正如在1930年代的许多手稿所证明的那样，在先验现象学的整个系统中正确评估其功能绝不是一项简单的任务。这些详细介绍了各种认识论和形而上学的困难以及潜在的悖论，这些难题阻碍了先有世界的概念。本文认为，可以通过重新审视胡塞尔关于地球的晚期概念，更具体地说，通过揭示其在先验构成中的先验功能，来缓解其中的一些困难。为了检验这一说法，我转向胡塞尔（Husserl）在1931年撰写的手稿，该手稿描述了“世界的原始获取”的悖论。