Scholars of Islamism have long grappled with the relationship between political participation and ideological change, theorizing that political exclusion and state repression increase the likelihood of Islamist groups using violence. The trajectory of post-2011 Egypt offers a chance to systematically evaluate these theories using subnational data. Pairing district-level electoral returns from pre-coup presidential elections with post-coup levels of anti-state and sectarian violence, we find that districts where Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated candidate Mohammed Morsi performed well in 2012 witnessed more anti-state and sectarian (anti-Christian) violence following the 2013 military coup. The same relationship holds for the performance of liberal Islamist Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, which is consistent with arguments that political exclusion alone may also drive violence.

伊斯兰学者长期以来一直在努力应对政治参与和意识形态变化之间的关系，并认为政治排斥和国家压迫增加了伊斯兰团体使用暴力的可能性。2011年后埃及的轨迹提供了使用次国家级数据系统地评估这些理论的机会。将政变前总统选举的地区级选举收益与政变后的反国家和宗派暴力水平相结合，我们发现，与穆斯林兄弟会相关的候选人穆罕默德·莫尔西（Mohammed Morsi）在2012年表现良好的地区见证了更多的反国家和宗派（anti -基督徒）在2013年军事政变后发生暴力。自由派伊斯兰主义者阿卜杜勒·穆尼姆·阿布·埃尔富图的表现也是如此，