Revolutionary coalitions often break down in the aftermath of revolution, leading to the collapse of transitional governments. Fragmentation among revolutionary elites has been extensively theorized, but few works consider the origins and consequences of polarization among non-elite protesters in the revolutionary coalition. This paper examines the case of Tunisia to unpack how polarization among former revolutionaries may drive secondary waves of mobilization that imperil governing coalitions, even when elites are cooperating. Unique protest surveys of pro- and anti-government demonstrations during the Tunisian political crisis of 2013 – which catalyzed the resignation of the country’s first elected assembly – show that polarization within this coalition occurred along ideological lines concerning the role of Islam in governance but not along class lines, as some theories of transition would predict. Revolutionaries are re-mobilized in part through divergent narratives concerning which social groups participated most in the revolutionary struggle, and which groups suffered and profited most under the old regime. This paper counters the elite-centrism of predominant “transitology” approaches by highlighting how protest politics may shape institutional transitions.

革命后，革命联盟经常崩溃，导致过渡政府垮台。革命精英之间的分裂人们已经对这一理论进行了广泛的理论探讨，但是很少有人考虑革命联盟中非精英抗议者之间两极分化的起源和后果。本文研究了突尼斯的案例，以揭示前革命者之间的两极分化如何驱动动员第二波的动荡，即使在精英合作的情况下也危及执政联盟。对2013年突尼斯政治危机期间亲和反政府示威活动的独特抗议调查（该国催生了该国首届民选议会的辞职），表明该联盟内部的两极分化是沿着关于伊斯兰在治理中的作用的意识形态路线发生的，而并非沿着正如一些过渡理论所预言的那样。革命者在某种程度上通过分歧的叙述而动员起来，这些叙述涉及哪些社会团体最参与革命斗争，哪些社会团体在旧政权下遭受的利益最大。本文通过强调抗议政治如何塑造制度变迁，来反驳主流“转运论”方法的精英中心主义。