This article suggests a change of perspective on philosophy’s engagement with its past. It argues that rather than the putative purport of giving life to the past philosopher’s work, philosophical engagement with the past gives life to one’s own. Drawing on the neo-pragmatist thesis of Robert Brandom, it suggests looking to what philosophers do when they attribute meaning to concepts and considering their engagement with the past as appropriation in consequence. By scrutinizing Robert Pippin’s opposing thesis of philosophical engagement with the past as dialogue, and carefully examining Brandom’s, the article suggests an account for appropriation that shows it to be non-dialogical, and hence unable to yield the fruits associated with this conception, but also insightful and rich with other philosophical values. Brandom and John McDowell’s dispute over the interpretation of Wilfrid Sellars provides an illustration of the proposed perspective and of those values.

本文提出了对哲学参与其过去的观点的改变。它认为，与过去的哲学交往不是将生命赋予过去的哲学家的假定推定目的，而是将生命赋予自己的生命。借鉴罗伯特·布兰顿的新实用主义的论点，它表明希望哲学家做时，他们属性含义的概念和考虑与过去作为订婚拨款结果。通过仔细检查罗伯特·皮平（Robert Pippin）与过去的哲学交往作为对话的对立论点，并仔细研究布兰登（Brandom）的论点，文章提出了一种占有的说明，表明它是非对话的，因此无法产生与这一构想相关的成果，而且洞察力强，并具有其他哲学价值。布兰登（Brandom）和约翰·麦克道威尔（John McDowell）在对威尔弗里德·塞拉斯（Wilfrid Sellars）的解释上的争议，提供了所提出的观点和这些价值的例证。