Philosophers generally recognize pragmatism as a philosophy of progress. For many commentators, pragmatism is linked to a notion of historical progress through its embrace of meliorism – a forward-looking philosophy that places hope in the future possibility of improvement. This paper calls pragmatism’s progressivism into question by outlining an alternative account of meliorism in the work of William James. Drawing on his ethical writings from the 1870s and 1880s, I argue that James’s concept of hope does not imply an embrace of historical progress, but remains detached from such a notion precisely insofar as it relies on a non-progressive temporality that encourages a rethinking of historical change. This form of hope is significant, I suggest, for the work of conceptualizing a non-progressive pragmatist approach to history and historiography.

哲学家们普遍认为实用主义是一种进步哲学。对于许多评论员来说，实用主义通过热衷主义而与历史进步的观念联系在一起。这种乐观主义是一种前瞻性的哲学，它将希望寄托在未来的改进中。本文通过概述威廉·詹姆斯（William James）作品中关于光荣主义的另一种说法，对实用主义的进步主义提出了质疑。根据他在1870年代和1880年代的伦理著作，我认为詹姆斯的希望概念并不意味着拥护历史进步，而恰恰是因为它依赖于一种非渐进的时间性，而这种时间性鼓励了人们对思想的重新思考，因此它仍然脱离了这一观念。历史的变化。我认为，这种希望形式对于将历史和史学的非渐进式实用主义方法概念化的工作意义重大。