The function of uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory) within classical Islamic law has been the object of protracted debate. Based on the writings of Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d.476/1083), I propose that uṣūl al-fiqh served two pedagogical purposes within the Iraqi legal community of the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries: first, to avoid taqlīd, defined as the subscription to a position without evidence; and second, to provide jurists with tools to assess the validity of a proof when they were confused about its merits. My analysis sheds light on uṣūl al-fiqh’s role in providing epistemological foundations for juristic reasoning. It also reveals that practical engagement on disputed legal matters (masāʾil al-khilāf) prevailed over uṣūl al-fiqh in the training of jurists. The consequence: uṣūl al-fiqh was a methodology of last resort.

的功能，美国UL AL-律古典伊斯兰法律范围内（法理）一直是长期争论的对象。根据阿布·伊萨克·阿勒·希拉吉（AbūIsḥāqal-Shīrāzī）（d.476 / 1083）的著作，我建议乌克·阿勒·菲克（uṣūlal -fiqh）在第4、10和5/11/11世纪的伊拉克法律界中具有两个教学目的：第一，避免taqlīd，定义为无证据的仓位；其次，为法学家提供了一种工具，可以在对证据的优缺点感到困惑时评估其有效性。我的分析阐明了uṣūlal-fiqh在为法律推理提供认识论基础方面的作用。它也揭示了在有争议的法律事务上的实际参与（masāʾilal-khilāf）在法学家的培训中胜过uṣūlal-fiqh。结果是：uṣūlal-fiqh是不得已的方法。