In this paper, we argue that the successful integration of expressive acts of communication into an inferential theory of pragmatics faces a major challenge. Most post-Gricean pragmatic theories have worked to develop accounts of the interpretive processes at work in the communication of propositions; the challenge, therefore, is how expressive acts be integrated when their content is, as it appears to be, non-propositional. Following previous research (Wharton, 2009), we link the affective effects produced as a result of such acts to descriptive ineffability and procedurality, and argue that they activate experiential heuristics through which they find relevance. Our approach stands at least partially within the development of recent approaches to emotion as evaluative devices (appraisal theory) and we suggest that certain cognitive effects arise in communication thanks to affective effects, which then act as attention attractors and boosters for optimally relevant cognitive effects. We show that, sometimes, affect can win out over the non-affective side of cognition and also that at least some poetic artefacts may activate ‘pure affective effects’, which can be relevant in their own right, i.e. relevant without cognitive effects.

在本文中，我们认为成功地将表达交流行为整合到实用主义推理理论中面临着重大挑战。多数后古希腊语用学理论都致力于阐述命题交流中的解释过程。因此，面临的挑战是，当表现形式的内容看上去是非命题性的时，如何整合它们。根据先前的研究（沃顿，2009年），我们将这种行为所产生的情感效果与描述性的无效率和程序性联系起来，并认为它们激活了经验启发法，从而找到了相关性。我们的方法至少部分地属于作为评估工具（评估理论）的最新情感方法的发展，并且我们建议，由于情感效果，交流中会产生某些认知效果，这些情感效果然后成为注意力吸引者和最佳相关认知效果的助推器。我们表明，有时情感可以战胜认知的非情感方面，而且至少某些诗意文物可能会激活“纯粹的情感效果”，这些效果本身就具有相关性，即没有认知效果就具有相关性。