There has been a significant increase of provisions dealing with labour standards in trade agreements (labour provisions). Will these labour provisions improve labour standards?

This article takes up this question in relation to the ‘Labour’ chapter of the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (‘CPTPP’). This chapter provides the crucial test for whether labour provisions (as currently framed) will improve labour standards, having been hailed by the United States government as providing ‘the strongest protections for workers of any trade agreement in history’.

Contrary to rhetoric accompanying this chapter, this article argues that it is a form of neoliberal regulation – faux regulation. It stands forth as an example of such legalised minimalism for three reasons. First, it provides for flexible standards particularly through its heavy reliance on rights recognised in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Second, it lays down standards for flexibility through non-existent standards, liquid-soft obligations, and heavily qualified obligations.

But third, the evidence shows that the parties to the agreement either have not ratified the core ILO Conventions on which the labour principles are based, or (using freedom of association as a case-study) are in breach of these obligations, sometimes in quite significant ways. The extent of non-compliance at the point of commencement raises serious questions about the integrity and purpose of the ‘Labour’ chapter. These reinforce the sense that the chapter is a form of faux regulation in which the parties have deliberately constructed a system of Mutually Assured Non-Compliance.

The article concludes by sketching out the broader implications of its analysis for other labour provisions and identifying ways to go beyond faux regulation.

贸易协定中有关劳工标准的规定（劳工规定）已大大增加。这些劳工规定会改善劳工标准吗？

本文针对“全面进步的跨太平洋伙伴关系”（“ CPTPP ”）的“劳动”一章讨论了这个问题。本章提供了至关重要的标准，以检验（按照目前的框架）劳工条款是否会改善劳工标准，这一点已被美国政府誉为“为历史上任何贸易协定中的工人提供最强有力的保护”。

与本章附带的言论相反，本文认为这是新自由主义监管的一种形式–虚假监管。出于以下三个原因，它作为这种合法化的极简主义的一个代表。首先，它特别通过严重依赖1998年国际劳工组织《工作中基本原则和权利宣言》所承认的权利，提供了灵活的标准。其次，它通过不存在的标准，具有流动性的软性义务和高度合格的义务来确定灵活性的标准。

但是第三，证据表明，协议的当事方要么没有批准劳工原则所依据的国际劳工组织核心公约，要么（使用结社自由作为案例研究）违反了这些义务，有时甚至违反了这些义务。重要的方式。在开始时不遵守的程度就“劳动”一章的完整性和目的提出了严重的问题。这进一步强化了本章是一种伪规章的形式，双方在此章中刻意构建了相互保证的不遵守制度。

本文最后总结了其分析对其他劳工条款的更广泛含义，并确定了超越伪法规的方法。