Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4). (Less)

中文翻译：

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规范实用主义视角下的所有权和第一人称权威

心理发作通常与主观所有权和第一人称权威有关。我相信苹果是红色的；这是我的，我有特权知道它。你的红色体验是你的；它是你的，你有特权知道它。这两个假设是，心理事件是由他们发生的个人所拥有，并且所有者处于特权认知地位，可以错误地报告他们自己的事件。本文询问如何理解所有权和第一人称权限（第 1 部分）。它认为不应默认接受这两个假设（第 2 节）。规范的实用主义被指定，在该实用主义上不属于精神事件，而是归因于理性表达的实践（第 3 节）。最后，考虑对所有权和第一人称权威的正面解释（第 4 节）。（较少的）