Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics is a method of intersubjective argumentation conceived to test the validity of moral norms on the basis of their universalizability. As some scholars have argued, Habermas’s proposal is problematic in that the process of argumentation is always affected by the circumstances of inequality and unfairness that pervade communal life and, therefore, it cannot be as inclusive and egalitarian as it needs to be in order to function effectively. In this paper, I argue that the solutions proposed by these scholars, namely, the improvement of social conditions and the pluralization of the process of argumentation, cannot by themselves resolve the practical limitation Habermas’s method presents. As an alternative, I adopt Philip Kitcher’s approach to ethics according to which the establishment of moral norms is oriented not to the resolution of disagreements but to the restitution of healthy relationships among individuals. On the basis of this alternative conception, I propose the addition to Habermas’s principle of universalization of a supplemental criterion of moral justification—one that makes the validity of norms dependent upon their potential to foster altruism.

于尔根·哈贝马斯（JürgenHabermas）的话语伦理学是一种主体间论证的方法，旨在根据道德规范的可普遍性来检验道德规范的有效性。正如一些学者所论证的那样，哈贝马斯的建议存在问题，因为辩论的过程总是受到普遍存在于社区生活中的不平等和不公平状况的影响，因此，它不能像其发挥作用所需要的那样具有包容性和平等性。有效地。在本文中，我认为这些学者提出的解决方案，即社会条件的改善和论证过程的多元化，本身无法解决哈贝马斯方法提出的实际局限性。作为备选，我采用菲利普·基彻（Philip Kitcher）的伦理学方法，根据该方法，道德规范的建立不是针对分歧的解决，而是针对个人之间健康关系的恢复。在这一替代概念的基础上，我提议在哈贝马斯的普遍化原则基础上增加一项道德正当性补充标准，该标准使道德规范的有效性取决于其促进利他主义的潜力。