The paper employs a pragmatist perspective on ethics to address the problem of empathy bias, an empirically documented phenomenon in which one’s ability to empathize with another is diminished simply because of that other’s membership in a perceived out-group. I first argue that the philosophical commitments that I take to be distinctive of pragmatism, specifically fallibilism, anti-absolutism, and democracy, require proactive empathetic engagement as a central component of moral inquiry. While this may initially seem to leave pragmatism vulnerable to concerns about empathy bias, I argue that the pragmatist is uniquely equipped to provide a particular sort of response to the problem: a response that does not jettison empathy from moral judgment, but rather seeks to utilize awareness of bias to appropriately correct empathetic engagement when addressing moral problems.

本文采用了实用主义的道德观来解决共情偏见的问题，这是一种经验证明的现象，其中一个人与另一个人的同理能力被削弱的原因仅仅是因为另一个人在一个感知到的群体之外的成员身份。我首先指出，我作为实用主义所特有的哲学承诺，特别是谬误主义，反专制主义和民主主义，要求积极进取的交往作为道德探究的重要组成部分。虽然这一开始似乎会使实用主义容易受到对移情偏见的担忧，但我认为实用主义者具有独特的能力，可以对问题做出特殊的回应：这种回应不会放弃道德判断上的移情，