Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort are limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko (2016) reported a recent case where such “objective” measures of effort were dissociated from judgments of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgments of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgments of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgments might better correspond to putatively “objective” measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko (2016) with additional probes for post-trial judgments of effort (i.e., a judgment of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgments of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgments of effort are discussed.

认知努力是我们生活中的核心结构，但我们对努力感知背后的过程的理解是有限的。表现通常被用作评估认知任务努力程度的一种方式（例如，耗时较长的任务通常被认为更努力）；然而，Dunn 和 Risko (2016) 报告了最近的一个案例，其中这种“客观”的努力措施与努力的判断（即主观努力）分离。当参与者在任务之后做出他们的努力判断（即阅读由轮换词组成的刺激）或从未执行任务时，就会发生这种分离。这留下了一种可能性，即如果参与者使他们对努力的判断更接近于执行任务的实际经验（例如，在给定的试验之后），这些判断可能更好地对应于假定的“客观”努力措施。为了解决这个问题，我们进行了两个重复 Dunn 和 Risko（2016 年）的实验，并对试验后的努力判断（即每次试验后立即做出的努力判断）进行了额外的探索。结果为以下观点提供了一些支持，即在试验后而不是任务后进行时，努力的判断更接近于阅读时间。讨论了当前工作对我们理解努力判断的影响。结果为以下观点提供了一些支持，即在试验后而不是任务后进行时，努力的判断更接近于阅读时间。讨论了当前工作对我们理解努力判断的影响。结果为以下观点提供了一些支持，即在试验后而不是任务后进行时，努力的判断更接近于阅读时间。讨论了当前工作对我们理解努力判断的影响。