1 INTRODUCTION

A core motivation of this paper is to recast sex selection as both a symptom of, and a contributing factor to global gender injustice, where the practice and its motivation are expressions of the broader structural inequalities and oppression faced by women and girls worldwide, be it in terms of status, relationships, or access to goods and opportunities (Jagger 2014, 23). While it may appear evident that the practice of sex selection is strongly embedded in gender injustice, various discourses have, at times, lost sight of this. This is in part due to disciplinary focus, and in part due to a lack of engagement with broader aspects of discrimination and oppression. I examine three particular ways of framing sex selection in the Indian—and South Asian diasporic—contexts and suggest that without an understanding of historical and current particularities, and more significantly, without a systematic engagement with considerations of justice, each of these approaches fails to fully capture the morally significant aspects of sex selection. The term (in)justice is used here as a broad concept, to capture considerations related to inequality, discrimination, oppression, and subjugation. The term also offers a strong normative and theoretical anchor, especially in its relationship to questions of responsibility. I do not suggest that there needs to be a single conception of justice toward which to strive, but would argue that any approach embedded in consideration of gender justice will aim, in some form or other, at diminishing gender-based inequality, discrimination, oppression, or subjugation.

Rajani Bhatia documents how in the mid-1990s, discussions around sex selection evolved in different directions, in interesting and telling ways. Sex selection through abortion was presented as “as act of violence against women,” in the context of rising global movements focused on issues of reproductive and sexual health, even as techniques for sex selection for “family balancing” were being marketed in the West (Bhatia 2018, 3–4), and celebrated as a “revolution in the way people have children” (Bhatia 2010, 267). Such problematic dichotomy (and moral double standard) has also, in part, motivated this paper. This is not to say, of course that all means of sex selection should be considered morally equivalent. However, focusing on the means of selection, or the decisions specifically associated with reproductive technology obfuscates an important moral aspect, which is the motivation behind the practice.

In advancing a gender justice lens to addressing sex selection, I suggest that it is possible to propose a global framing based on justice, that does not fall prey to either moral imperialism or moral relativism, but one that is based on transnational feminist solidarity and scholarship. Having discussed some of the problematic ways in which sex selection is often framed, I explore a means of addressing this specific expression of gender injustice through philosopher Iris Marion Young's social connection model of responsibility (Young 2006). Addressing global gender injustice in relation to sex selection requires focusing our moral lens on actors who are in specific positions of privilege, and therefore, have some capacity to change the norms, structures, and practices which contribute to injustice. In this particular debate, I position myself as a feminist member of the Indian Diaspora, with the privilege and responsibility this might entail for disrupting cultural hegemony and academic discourse on sex selection. As a researcher living away from India, however, I have limited lived experience of the complex factors that govern the lives of girls and women in the region, and while I propose an universalist approach to sex selection, I am equally aware of my own epistemic limitations in the area.

中文翻译：

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性别选择和全球性别公正

1 介绍

本文的一个核心动机是将性别选择重新定义为全球性别不公正的症状和促成因素，这种做法及其动机表达了全世界妇女和女童面临的更广泛的结构性不平等和压迫，无论是在地位、关系或获得商品和机会方面（Jagger 2014, 23)。虽然性别选择的做法似乎很明显地植根于性别不公正，但有时，各种话语都忽略了这一点。这部分是由于对纪律的关注，部分是由于缺乏对歧视和压迫的更广泛方面的参与。我研究了在印度和南亚侨民背景下构建性别选择的三种特定方式，并表明如果不了解历史和当前的特殊性，更重要的是，如果没有系统地考虑正义，这些方法中的每一种都无法充分捕捉性别选择的道德意义方面。术语（不）正义此处用作一个广义概念，以涵盖与不平等、歧视、压迫和征服相关的考虑因素。该术语还提供了强大的规范和理论基础，尤其是在其与责任问题的关系方面。我不建议需要有一个单一的正义概念来努力，但我认为任何考虑性别正义的方法都将以某种形式旨在减少基于性别的不平等、歧视、压迫，或征服。

Rajani Bhatia 记录了在 1990 年代中期，围绕性别选择的讨论如何以有趣且有说服力的方式向不同方向发展。在关注生殖和性健康问题的全球运动不断兴起的背景下，通过堕胎进行的性别选择被描述为“对妇女的暴力行为”，即使西方正在推销“家庭平衡”的性别选择技术（ Bhatia 2018 , 3–4)，并被誉为“人们生孩子方式的革命”（Bhatia 2010, 267)。这种有问题的二分法（和道德双重标准）也部分地激发了本文的动机。当然，这并不是说所有的性别选择方式都应该被认为在道德上是等效的。然而，专注于选择的手段，或与生殖技术特别相关的决定混淆了一个重要的道德方面，这是实践背后的动机。

在推进性别正义视角来解决性别选择问题时，我建议提出一个基于正义的全球框架，该框架既不会成为道德帝国主义也不会成为道德相对主义的牺牲品，而是基于跨国女权主义团结和学术的框架. 在讨论了性别选择经常被框定的一些有问题的方式之后，我探索了一种通过哲学家 Iris Marion Young 的责任社会联系模型（Young 2006）。解决与性别选择相关的全球性别不公正问题，需要将我们的道德视角聚焦于处于特定特权地位的行为者，因此，他们有能力改变导致不公正的规范、结构和做法。在这场特殊的辩论中，我将自己定位为印度侨民中的女权主义者，并肩负着打破关于性别选择的文化霸权和学术话语的特权和责任。然而，作为一名生活在印度以外的研究人员，我对支配该地区女孩和妇女生活的复杂因素的生活经验有限，虽然我提出了一种普遍主义的性别选择方法，但我同样意识到我自己的认知区域的限制。