In (Re-) Defining Racism, Alberto Urquidez argues that conflicting philosophical accounts over the definition of racism are at bottom linguistic confusions that would benefit from a Wittgensteinian-inspired approach. In this essay, I argue that such an approach would be helpful in disputes over the definition of metaphysically contested concepts, such as “race,” or semantically contested concepts, such as “racialization.” I disagree, however, that such insights would prove helpful or do very little for disputes concerning normatively contested concepts, such as “racism.”

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作为工具而非规则的概念：关于（重新）定义种族主义的评论

在（重新）定义种族主义中，阿尔贝托·乌尔奎兹（Alberto Urquidez）认为，关于种族主义定义的矛盾哲学解释是最底层的语言混乱，而这将受益于维特根斯坦主义的启发。在本文中，我认为这种方法将有助于解决有关形而上竞争的概念（例如“种族”）或语义上竞争的概念（例如“种族化”）的争议。但是，我不同意这样的见解对证明与“种族主义”这样的规范性竞争概念有关的争端将是有帮助的，或者是无济于事的。