We study the effects of deliberation on epistemic social choice, in two settings. In the first setting, the group faces a binary epistemic decision analogous to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In the second setting, group members have probabilistic beliefs arising from their private information, and the group wants to aggregate these beliefs in a way that makes optimal use of this information. During deliberation, each agent discloses private information to persuade the other agents of her current views. But her views may also evolve over time, as she learns from other agents. This process will improve the performance of the group, but only under certain conditions; these involve the nature of the social decision rule, the group size, and also the presence of “neutral agents” whom the other agents try to persuade.

我们在两种情况下研究审议对认知社会选择的影响。首先，该小组面临类似于Condorcet Jury定理的二元认知决定。在第二种情况下，小组成员从其私人信息中产生了概率信念，小组希望以最佳利用这些信息的方式来汇总这些信念。在审议过程中，每个代理人都会公开私人信息，以说服其他代理人当前的观点。但是，随着她向其他特工学习，她的观点也可能随着时间而演变。该过程将改善小组的绩效，但前提是要在某些条件下进行；这些因素涉及社会决策规则的性质，群体规模以及其他行为者试图说服的“中立行为者”的存在。