We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender’s message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.

中文翻译：

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用内生的，错误指定的信念进行说服

我们研究了一个两动作，两状态的纯说服游戏，其中接收者具有非理性的期望。发件人可以通过将其与其他邮件合并在一起来为其邮件添加歧义。这可以比作原始消息的选择性编辑。接收者知道发送者的消息策略，但不知道他的编辑策略，并且仅使用前者从已编辑的消息中得出推论。我们描述了在这种情况下发件人可以说服的最高可能性。