Once banks are viewed as money creators rather than financial intermediaries, a distinction between their cash funding and balance sheet funding can be made. This distinction opens up various insights. It allows for a fuller explanation of the cash needs of banks with reference to the pattern of their cash gains and losses. It facilitates an understanding of the central bank as not only a cash lender of last resort (LOLR) for some banks some of the time, but also as a cash lender of continual and only resort (LOCOR) for all banks all of the time. It leads to novel insights into the sources of banks' balance sheet funding. The paper investigates the various implications of the central bank's elastic currency policy in its role as LOCOR, particularly how it thereby incites considerably more moral hazard than conventionally acknowledged. This realisation opens up a better understanding of the banking sector's proneness to excess and the economy's susceptibility to financial cycles. The paper concludes by weighing the merits of the only two policy strategies by which banking excess can be checked.

一旦将银行视为钱的创造者，而不是金融中介，则可以在现金资金和资产负债表资金之间进行区分。这种区别开辟了各种见解。它可以参考银行现金损益的模式来更全面地解释银行的现金需求。它不仅有助于使中央银行了解某些时间不仅是某些银行的最后贷款人（LOLR），而且始终是所有银行的连续和唯一贷款人（LOCOR）。它导致对银行资产负债表资金来源的新颖见解。本文研究了中央银行的弹性货币政策在其作为LOCOR方面的各种含义，特别是它如何由此引发了比传统上公认的更大的道德风险。认识到这一点后，人们可以更好地了解银行业的过度过度倾向和经济对金融周期的敏感性。本文通过权衡仅有的两种可以检查银行业超额收益的政策策略的优缺点来得出结论。