Hedge fund activists have ambiguous relationships with the institutional shareholders in their target firms. While some support their activities, others counter their actions. Due to their relatively small holdings in target firms, activists typically need the cooperation of other institutional shareholders that are willing to influence the activists’ campaign success. We find the presence of “activism-friendly” institutions as owners is associated with an increased probability of being a target, higher long-term stock returns, and higher operating performance. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting the composition of a firm’s ownership has significant effects on hedge fund activists’ decisions and outcomes. (JEL: G13, G23, G34)

中文翻译：

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机构投资者与对冲基金行动主义

对冲基金激进主义者与目标公司中的机构股东关系模糊。有些人支持他们的活动，而另一些人则反对他们的行动。由于激进分子在目标公司中的持股量相对较小，因此通常需要其他愿意影响激进分子竞选成功的机构股东的合作。我们发现，存在“积极行动主义”的机构，因为所有者会增加其成为目标的可能性，更高的长期股票回报率和更高的运营绩效。总体而言，我们提供的证据表明，公司所有权的构成对对冲基金激进主义者的决策和结果产生了重大影响。（JEL： G13，G23，G34）