In both the subprime crisis and the eurozone crisis, regulators imposed bans on short sales mainly aimed at preventing stock price turbulence from destabilizing financial institutions. Contrary to the regulators’ intentions, financial institutions whose stocks were banned experienced greater increases in the probability of default and volatility than unbanned ones. Increases were larger for more vulnerable financial institutions. To take into account the endogeneity of short sales bans, we match banned financial institutions with unbanned ones with similar sizes and levels of riskiness and instrument the 2011 ban decisions with regulators’ propensity to impose a ban in the 2008 crisis. (JEL G01, G12, G14, G18)

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卖空禁令和银行稳定

在次贷危机和欧元区危机中，监管机构都禁止卖空，主要目的是防止股票价格动荡破坏金融机构的稳定。与监管机构的意图相反，被禁止发行股票的金融机构的违约概率和波幅比未禁止的更大。对于较脆弱的金融机构而言，增长幅度更大。考虑到卖空禁令的内生性，我们将被禁金融机构与风险规模和风险水平相似的未被禁金融机构进行匹配，并以监管机构倾向于在2008年危机中实施禁令的方式来制定2011年禁令的决定。（JEL G01，G12，G14，G18）