Not all probability ascriptions that appear in scientific theories describe chances. There is a question about whether probability ascriptions in non-fundamental sciences, such as those found in evolutionary biology and statistical mechanics, describe chances in deterministic worlds and about whether there could be any chances in deterministic worlds. Recent debate over whether chance is compatible with determinism has unearthed two strategies for arguing about whether a probability ascription describes chance—that is, to speak metaphorically, two different strategies for figuring out where the chances are: find the chances by focusing on chance’s explanatory role or find the chances by focusing on chance’s predictive role. These two strategies tend to yield conflicting results about where the chances are, and debate over which strategy is appropriate tends to end in stalemate. After discussing these two strategies, I consider a new view of chance’s explanatory role. I argue that one theoretical advantage of this new view is that allows us to make progress on the question of where the chances are by providing a principled way of determining which probability ascriptions describe chances. From the vantage of this new view, the correct application of both strategies involves figuring out where the chances are by figuring out where the probabilistic scientific explanations are and what those explanations are like.

并非所有出现在科学理论中的概率描述都描述了机会。存在一个问题，即非基础科学中的概率归因（例如在进化生物学和统计力学中发现的归因）是否描述了确定性世界中的机会，以及是否存在任何可能性确定性世界中的机会。最近关于机会是否与确定性兼容的争论已经出台了两种策略来争论概率归因是否描述了机会，也就是说，比喻地说，两种不同的策略可以弄清机会在哪里：通过关注机会的解释性角色来找到机会。或通过关注机会的预测作用来找到机会。这两种策略往往会在机会在何处产生矛盾的结果，关于哪种策略合适的争论往往会陷入僵局。在讨论了这两种策略之后，我考虑了机会的解释作用的新观点。我认为，这种新观点的理论优势是，通过提供一种确定哪些概率归因描述机会的原则性方法，我们可以在机会在何处的问题上取得进展。从这种新观点的角度出发，两种策略的正确应用都涉及通过找出概率科学解释在哪里以及那些解释是什么样来找出机会。