In this article, we consider the impact uncertainty has on policies and realization of targets aimed at the stabilization of government debt. The problem is motivated by the fact that in many countries revenues are to a large extent uncertain. Following Tabellini (TEDC 4: 427–442, 1986), we model the debt stabilization problem as a dynamic game between government and central bank. However, different from Tabellini (TEDC 4: 427–442, 1986) we assume that nominal income in this problem setting is uncertain and model its price dynamics by a stochastic differential equation. By employing the quotient rule from stochastic calculus, government debt, primary fiscal deficit, and base money are scaled by this nominal income process. Then, the debt stabilization problem is formulated within this stochastic framework. Assuming a feedback information structure we solve the problem both within a non-cooperative and cooperative mode of play. To explore the effects of uncertainty on government and central bank polices and debt stability, we perform a simulation study and sensitivity analysis. One of the major conclusions from this study seems to be that cooperation has a smoothing effect on pursued policies but that this does not necessarily lead on average to a better tracking of the debt target. Furthermore, we observe that the more uncertainty there is, the more policymakers are inclined to emphasize the stabilization of debt.

在本文中，我们考虑不确定性对旨在稳定政府债务的政策和目标实现的影响。这个问题是由许多国家的收入在很大程度上不确定的事实引起的。遵循塔贝利尼（TEDC 4：427–442，1986），我们将债务稳定问题建模为政府与中央银行之间的动态博弈。但是，与塔贝利尼（TEDC 4：427–442，1986）不同，我们假设此问题中的名义收入是不确定的，并通过随机微分方程对其价格动态进行建模。通过采用随机演算的商法，政府债务，基本财政赤字和基础货币将通过此名义收入过程进行缩放。然后，在这种随机框架内提出债务稳定问题。假设反馈信息结构，我们可以在非合作和合作的游戏模式下解决问题。为了探索不确定性对政府和中央银行政策以及债务稳定性的影响，我们进行了模拟研究和敏感性分析。这项研究的主要结论之一似乎是，合作对奉行的政策具有平滑作用，但是，这不一定会导致平均更好地跟踪债务目标。此外，我们观察到不确定性越多，决策者就越倾向于强调债务的稳定。这项研究的主要结论之一似乎是，合作对奉行的政策具有平滑作用，但是，这不一定会导致平均更好地跟踪债务目标。此外，我们观察到不确定性越多，决策者就越倾向于强调债务的稳定。这项研究的主要结论之一似乎是，合作对奉行的政策具有平滑作用，但是，这不一定会导致平均更好地跟踪债务目标。此外，我们发现不确定性越多，决策者就越倾向于强调债务的稳定。