Purpose

This study aims to examine the effects of investor protection (PROT), internal and external corporate governance (CG) on private information-based trading (PIBT).

Design/methodology/approach

This study uses a sample of 3,438 firms from 42 countries for the period 2002–2015 to examine the effects of the broad and specific measures of PROT, internal CG and external CG (product market competition and block ownership [BOWN]) on a more accurate measure of PIBT using regression analysis.

Findings

The results show that PROT and BOWN are effective in reducing PIBT. However, the specific measure of PROT (strength of PROT) is not significant in emerging markets and civil law countries. The internal CG is also significant but has a positive effect on PIBT.

Research limitations/implications

The results suggest that PROT law matters in the efforts to prevent PIBT. Policymakers and securities market regulators, particularly in emerging markets and civil law countries, should focus more on refining existing securities laws and enacting detailed securities rules that explicitly prevent specific market manipulation and PIBT.

Originality/value

This study provides evidence for the importance of specific and detailed securities rules in different market and legal environments. Furthermore, this study uses the segregated private information-based speculative trading component to accurately measure the PIBT.

中文翻译：

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投资者保护、公司治理和基于私人信息的交易

目的

本研究旨在检验投资者保护 (PROT)、内部和外部公司治理 (CG) 对基于私人信息的交易 (PIBT) 的影响。

设计/方法/方法

本研究使用了 2002 年至 2015 年期间来自 42 个国家的 3,438 家公司的样本，以检查 PROT、内部 CG 和外部 CG（产品市场竞争和大宗所有权 [BOWN]）的广泛和具体措施对更准确的影响。使用回归分析测量 PIBT。

发现

结果表明 PROT 和 BOWN 在降低 PIBT 方面是有效的。但是，PROT（PROT强度）的具体衡量标准在新兴市场和大陆法系国家并不重要。内部 CG 也很重要，但对 PIBT 有积极影响。

研究限制/影响

结果表明，PROT 法在防止 PIBT 的努力中很重要。政策制定者和证券市场监管机构，尤其是新兴市场和大陆法系国家的政策制定者，应更多地关注完善现有证券法并制定详细的证券规则，明确防止特定的市场操纵和 PIBT。

原创性/价值

本研究为不同市场和法律环境中具体和详细的​​证券规则的重要性提供了证据。此外，本研究使用隔离的基于私人信息的投机交易组件来准确衡量 PIBT。