Purpose

The causes for the formation of a bubble in the collateral market when agents are provided with homogeneous expectations are explored. This bubbly dynamics will define a sufficient condition for deleveraging.

Design/methodology/approach

Theoretical approach with neutral deleveraging.

Findings

Findings of the study are defined sufficient conditions for a behavioral rational bubble's formation in a market of collateral and the subsequent deleveraging. The crowd-in effect of the representative bubble is caused by errors in extrapolating information and thus by representativeness, while the crowd-out effect of deleveraging is set off by reverting to a rational heuristic.

Research limitations/implications

The limit is that it is a homogeneous expectations approach, the implication is that cannot be rational speculation.

Practical implications

Even in a simple model of homogeneous expectations a bubble may arise with serious effect on the demand side: models that detect just rational mispricings cannot account for behavioral components that have financial and real effects.

Originality/value

The paper defines how deleveraging may occur even in case of homogeneous expectations. The latter should not be seen just as a limit but also as a signal of the importance of being aware of behavioral components.

中文翻译：

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代表性泡沫与去杠杆化

目的

当代理人被提供同质期望时，抵押品市场中形成泡沫的原因进行了探索。这种充满活力的动态将定义去杠杆化的充分条件。

设计/方法/方法

中性去杠杆的理论方法。

发现

该研究的结果为抵押品市场中行为理性泡沫的形成和随后的去杠杆化定义了充分条件。代表性泡沫的挤入效应是由信息外推的错误引起的，因此是由代表性引起的，而去杠杆化的挤出效应是通过回归理性启发式来引发的。

研究限制/影响

局限性在于它是一种同质预期方法，言下之意是不能进行理性投机。

实际影响

即使在同质预期的简单模型中，也可能出现泡沫，对需求方产生严重影响：仅检测理性错误定价的模型无法解释具有财务和实际影响的行为成分。

原创性/价值

该论文定义了即使在预期一致的情况下，去杠杆化也可能如何发生。后者不应仅被视为一种限制，而应视为意识到行为成分的重要性的信号。