Purpose

This paper aims to examine the impact of female board directorship on the extent of earnings management.

Design/methodology/approach

The research hypotheses have been tested using both univariate and multivariate analyzes based on a sample of 198 firm-year observations from closely-held family firms listed on the SBF 120 over the period 2010–2018.

Findings

The empirical results first indicate that female board participation reduces the level of earnings management. When looking at women positions in the companies’ boardrooms, the authors reveal that the negative linkage between female board directorship and earnings management remains constant for independent female directors while the opposite holds for their family-affiliated counterparts. Further, the gender quota reform is shown to mitigate the adverse relationship between gender-diverse corporate boards and the extent of earnings management. These results seem sound, as they hold unchanged for the several measures of, both, boardroom gender diversity and earnings management used in the empirical study. In a supplementary analysis, the authors provide evidence that the association between the presence of women directors on the companies’ boards and earnings management depends, in a different way, on the size of the audit firm in a joint auditing context.

Originality/value

The country and the period considered in this paper are noteworthy characteristics that enhance the value of this research. The present study is relevant because it examines the relationship between female boardroom participation and earnings management using a homogeneous sample of family-owned and -managed companies within which shareholders and board members share identical motives for manipulating earnings in one of the leading countries in the world with regard to family ownership dominance (i.e. France). Moreover, this paper is considered to be very timely, as it explores, contrarily to previous related studies, the years following the implementation of a mandatory gender quota reform in one of the less available countries, to date, that have amended a gender quota law. To the knowledge, besides France, there are a few markets (Norway, Belgium, Finland and Iceland) that have implemented such legislation.

中文翻译：

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女董事会董事和盈余管理

目的

本文旨在研究女性董事会董事对盈余管理范围的影响。

设计/方法/方法

研究假说已使用单变量和多变量分析进行了检验，该分析基于2010-2018年间SBF 120上市的紧密家族企业的198个公司年度观察值的样本。

发现

实证结果首先表明，女性董事会的参与降低了盈余管理水平。当查看公司董事会中的女性职位时，作者发现，女性独立董事中女性董事会董事与收入管理之间的负面联系保持不变，而与家族有关联的女性董事则相反。此外，性别配额改革显示出减轻了性别多样化的公司董事会与收入管理范围之间的不利关系。这些结果似乎是合理的，因为对于实证研究中使用的董事会性别多样性和收入管理这两项指标均保持不变。在补充分析中，

创意/价值

本文所考虑的国家和时期是值得注意的特征，这些特征增强了本研究的价值。本研究之所以具有相关性，是因为它使用家族企业和托管公司的同类样本研究了女性董事会成员的参与与盈余管理之间的关系，在该样本中，股东和董事会成员在全球领先的国家之一中拥有相同的动机来操纵盈余。关于家庭所有权的主导地位（即法国）。此外，该文件被认为是非常及时的，因为它与以往的相关研究相反，探索了在迄今鲜为人知的其中一个修订了性别配额法的国家中实施强制性性别配额改革的年份。 。据了解，除法国外，还有一些市场（挪威，