Purpose

Based on social network theory and the literature of contract governance, the purpose of this study is to explore how distributors’ “banding together” (network intensity) affects contract governance (detailed contracts), which, in turn, influences channel conflict and simultaneously tests the moderating effect of network centrality.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors collect the data from the side of 288 manufacturers.

Findings

This study finds that, first, distributors’ network intensity positively affects detailed contracts between manufacturers and distributors; second, detailed contracts, in turn, declines channel conflict; and third, network centrality will weaken the positive influence of network density on detailed contracts. In addition, an ex post analysis finds that detailed contracts play a negative mediating role between distributors’ network density and channel conflict and this negative mediating effect would be weakened by distributors’ network centrality.

Originality/value

The current study not only helps to make up for the shortcomings of using the dyadic analysis paradigm to analyze channel behavior but also helps manufacturers to understand and respond to the phenomenon of distributors’ “banding together” comprehensively and deeply.

中文翻译：

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分销商的“捆绑”对营销渠道中的合同治理有何影响？

目的

基于社会网络理论和合同治理的文献，本研究的目的是探讨分销商的“捆绑”（网络强度）如何影响合同治理（详细合同），进而影响渠道冲突并同时进行测试网络中心化的调节作用。

设计/方法/方法

作者从288家制造商那边收集数据。

发现

这项研究发现，首先，分销商的网络强度对制造商和分销商之间的详细合同产生积极影响。其次，详细合同反过来减少了渠道冲突；第三，网络中心性将削弱网络密度对详细合同的积极影响。此外，事后分析发现，详细合同在分销商的网络密度和渠道冲突之间起着消极的中介作用，而这种消极的中介作用将因分销商的网络中心性而减弱。

创意/价值

当前的研究不仅有助于弥补使用二分法分析范式分析渠道行为的缺陷，而且还可以帮助制造商全面深入地理解和应对分销商“团结”的现象。