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Minority shareholder treatment surrounding the Dell MBO
Managerial Finance ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-12 , DOI: 10.1108/mf-09-2019-0480
Timothy A. Kruse

Purpose

This paper is a clinical examination of the October 2013 Management Buyout of Dell Inc. by founder Michael Dell and Silver Lake Partners for a total consideration of $13.88 per share. The proposed transaction was targeted by shareholders unhappy with the deal price and voting framework. Various shareholders went on to file an appraisal suit. Examining these events yields insights into shareholder rights issues in a major transaction.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper examines events surrounding the acquisition including the negotiation process, go-shop period, shareholder activist demands for a higher price, shareholder voting and the subsequent appraisal trial and appeal.

Findings

Despite suggesting Dell's board fulfilled its fiduciary duties, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster awarded petitioning shareholders $17.62 per share, a 27% premium to the final deal consideration. This article draws on Laster's decision and research examining topics raised by the surrounding events to argue minority shareholder interests were not sufficiently protected.

Research limitations/implications

The Dell transaction represents only one data point. Moreover, Vice Chancellor Laster's decision was reversed on appeal.

Originality/value

Nevertheless, the paper discusses the nuances surrounding many issues of interest to practitioners involving large going private transactions. It could also be used to illustrate many “real world” perspectives in an advanced corporate finance or mergers and acquisitions class.



中文翻译:

围绕戴尔 MBO 的少数股东待遇

目的

本文是对创始人 Michael Dell 和 Silver Lake Partners 于 2013 年 10 月以每股 13.88 美元的总对价收购戴尔公司的临床研究。拟议交易的目标是对交易价格和投票框架不满意的股东。多位股东继续提起评估诉讼。检查这些事件可以深入了解重大交易中的股东权利问题。

设计/方法/方法

本文考察了与收购相关的事件,包括谈判过程、采购期、股东维权要求更高的价格、股东投票以及随后的评估审判和上诉。

发现

尽管暗示戴尔董事会履行了其受托责任,特拉华州副校长特拉维斯·拉斯特 (Travis Laster) 仍向请愿股东授予每股 17.62 美元,比最终交易对价溢价 27%。本文借鉴了 Laster 的决定和研究,对周围事件引发的主题进行了研究,以论证小股东利益没有得到充分保护。

研究限制/影响

戴尔交易仅代表一个数据点。此外,副校长拉斯特的决定在上诉中被推翻。

原创性/价值

然而,本文讨论了涉及大型私有化交易的从业者感兴趣的许多问题的细微差别。它还可用于在高级公司财务或并购课程中说明许多“现实世界”的观点。

更新日期:2021-03-12
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