Purpose

Determining the optimal capital structure becomes more complicated by the presence of an agency problem. The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism introduces the asset substitution problem – the agency cost of debt. Thus, there is a recognized need for models that can resolve the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager who acts on behalf of the shareholder, leading to optimal capital structure choice, and enhanced firm value. The purpose of this paper is to model the debtholder-manager agency problem as a dynamic game, resolve the conflicts of interests and determine the optimal capital structure.

Design/methodology/approach

As there is no satisfactory model for dealing with the above issues, this paper uses a differential game framework to analyze the incongruity of interests between the debtholder and the manager as a non-cooperative dynamic game and further resolves the conflicts of interests as a cooperative game via a Pareto-efficient outcome.

Findings

The optimal capital structure required to minimize the marginal cost of the agency problem is a higher use of debt, lower cost of equity and withheld capital distributions. The debtholder is also able to enforce cooperation from the manager by providing a lower and stable cost of debt and a greater debt facility in the overtime framework.

Originality/value

The study develops a new dynamic contract theory model based on the integrated issues of capital structure, corporate governance and agency problems and applies the differential game approach to minimize the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager.

中文翻译：

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最优资本结构与债权人-经理利益冲突：一种管理决策模型

目的

由于代理问题的存在，确定最优资本结构变得更加复杂。作为公司治理机制的债务发行引入了资产替代问题——债务的代理成本。因此，人们认识到需要可以解决债务人和代表股东行事的经理之间的代理问题的模型，从而导致最优的资本结构选择，并提高公司价值。本文的目的是将债务人-经理代理问题建模为一个动态博弈，解决利益冲突并确定最优资本结构。

设计/方法/方法

由于上述问题尚无令人满意的处理模型，本文采用微分博弈框架将债权人与管理人之间的利益不协调作为非合作动态博弈进行分析，进一步将利益冲突作为合作博弈进行化解。通过帕累托有效的结果。

发现

最小化代理问题边际成本所需的最佳资本结构是更多地使用债务、更低的股本成本和预扣资本分配。债务持有人还能够通过在加班框架内提供较低且稳定的债务成本和更大的债务融资来加强经理的合作。

原创性/价值

该研究基于资本结构、公司治理和代理问题的综合问题开发了一个新的动态契约理论模型，并应用微分博弈方法来最小化债务人和经理之间的代理问题。