Purpose

This paper aims to expose the nature, pattern and mechanism of Roman private enterprise as the rudimentary form of capitalistic business. In the second part, it is shown why and how the directorship of slaves in private enterprise appeared and what shape it took.

Design/methodology/approach

By means of historical analysis and theoretical reconstruction, the author reveals the pattern and mechanism of business through slaves as the primordial form of private enterprise.

Findings

A comprehensive view of public and private entrepreneurship at the end of Republic and the beginning of Empire is presented. The origin and advantages of Roman public enterprise acknowledged by the state are brought to light. The way the benefits the corporate status affords were adjusted to a business framework allowed by law is demonstrated. It is just business through slaves that, combining peculium with free administration, secured limited liability for owners and turned the slaves to whom a business was entrusted into a kind of director. This construction enabled masters to become the proprietor of many formally separate enterprises at once, thereby expanding their business into something like a holding.

Research limitations/implications

The results obtained allow historians to retrace the origins of modern private enterprise to classical antiquity, and economists and managers to better understand the nature of private enterprise and organizational status of those owning and managing it.

Practical implications

Leaders and executives can draw from the paper an object lesson of how to make, within the existing political system, legal regulation and economic traditions, a radical innovation whose true meaning and social potential are so immense and far-reaching that show up in full measure evident many centuries later. The findings and conclusions the author comes to may be used in educational courses on economics, entrepreneurship, management, business history and so on.

Social implications

The paper provides an instructive model of conciliation of interests (social “compromise”). “Directors” – those organizing and managing a business but not owning it – were held subject to proprietors but within legally regulated relations with them. The state created incentives for initiative and competent businessmen in subjection to well-offs, to work hard, on one hand, and made their masters to use these incentives to public and their own profits. The benefits of all parties were taken into account, though, of course, not to the same degree.

Originality/value

The structure and “engine” of Roman private enterprise as well as the functions and organizational status of its “director” are demonstrated in relief for the first time.

中文翻译：

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资本主义的萌芽（罗马商业通过奴隶作为私人企业的基础）。第二部分。法人的对应方

目的

本文旨在揭示罗马私营企业作为资本主义商业的基本形式的性质、模式和机制。第二部分说明了私营企业奴隶制出现的原因、方式和形式。

设计/方法/方法

笔者通过历史分析和理论重构，揭示了以奴隶为主要形式的民营企业的经营模式和机制。

发现

全面介绍了共和国末期和帝国初期的公共和私人企业家精神。国家承认的罗马公营企业的起源和优势被揭示出来。展示了公司地位所提供的利益根据法律允许的业务框架进行调整的方式。正是通过奴隶开展业务，将特权与自由管理相结合，为所有者确保了有限责任，并将受托开展业务的奴隶变成了某种董事。这种结构使大师们同时成为许多正式分离的企业的所有者，从而将他们的业务扩展为类似于控股的东西。

研究限制/影响

获得的结果使历史学家能够将现代私营企业的起源追溯到古典时代，让经济学家和管理者更好地了解私营企业的性质以及拥有和管理私营企业的人的组织地位。

实际影响

领导者和高管可以从论文中吸取一个客观的教训，即如何在现有的政治制度、法律监管和经济传统中进行彻底的创新，其真正意义和社会潜力是如此巨大和深远，并充分体现出来。许多世纪后明显。作者得出的发现和结论可用于经济、创业、管理、商业史等方面的教育课程。

社会影响

该论文提供了一种利益协调（社会“妥协”）的指导模型。“董事”——那些组织和管理企业但不拥有它的人——受制于所有人，但与他们处于法律规范的关系中。国家一方面鼓励主动和有能力的商人服从小康，努力工作，并让他们的主人利用这些激励措施为公共和自己谋利。当然，各方的利益都被考虑到了不同的程度。

原创性/价值

罗马私营企业的结构和“引擎”，以及其“董事”的职能和组织地位，首次得到了浮雕的展示。