Purpose

This paper aims to examine the effect of governance mechanisms (board size, board independence, duality, the Sharia board size, Sharia board meetings and ownership concentration) on the performance of insurance providers of distinguishable Muamalah contracts (wakalah and hybrid), moderated by the length of senior leaders’ servicing time.

Design/methodology/approach

The full sample includes 21 listed Takaful companies divided into two subsamples – 12 insurance wakalah contracts offered in the South East Asian (SEA) countries and 9 insurance hybrid contracts offered in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period of 2012–2018. The methodology is informed by Baron and Kenny’s (1986) moderation process approach.

Findings

The results of this study indicate that the larger the size of directors’ board and the higher the number of outside directors, the greater the SEA wakalah Takaful insurance performance. Nondual functions and a larger size of Sharia board along with a highly-concentrated ownership structure have a positive effect on the Takaful insurance performance in both the SEA and GCC regions. Furthermore, the higher the Sharia board meetings, the higher performance of all types of Takaful insurance providers in the sample. As for the moderating effect of the director’s seniority, it is found to negatively moderate the relationship between the governance mechanisms and the Takaful performance in both regions.

Originality/value

This paper highlights that the leader’s entrenchment stands as an obstructing factor impeding the governance mechanisms from enhancing Takaful performance. Thus, it serves to contribute to clearly understanding the appropriate governance mechanisms usefully fit for a Takaful insurance effective performance, applying the wakalah and hybrid contract types. Such a contribution should be appreciated by the concerned regulators engaged in setting up limited serving periods for the directors whereby the Takaful insurance practice could be efficiently managed and supervised.

中文翻译：

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治理机制和回教保险业绩：领导者资历的调节作用

目的

本文旨在研究治理机制（董事会规模，董事会独立性，双重性，伊斯兰教法董事会规模，伊斯兰教法董事会会议和所有权集中度）对可区分的Muamalah合同（wakalah和混合型）保险提供者的绩效的影响，并由其监督。高级领导者服务时间的长短。

设计/方法/方法

完整样本包括21个上市的回教保险公司，分为两个子样本– 2012-2018年期间，东南亚（SEA）国家提供了12个保险wakalah合同，海湾合作委员会（GCC）国家提供了9个保险混合合同。该方法学由Baron和Kenny（1986）的审核过程方法提供。

发现

这项研究的结果表明，董事局规模越大，外部董事人数越多，SEA wakalah Takaful保险的业绩就越好。非双重功能和更大的伊斯兰教法委员会规模以及高度集中的所有权结构，对东南亚和海湾合作委员会地区的回教保险业绩均产生积极影响。此外，伊斯兰教法委员会会议越高，样本中所有类型的回教保险提供者的绩效就越高。至于董事资历的调节作用，发现这对两个地区的治理机制和回教保险业绩之间的关系产生负面影响。

创意/价值

本文着重指出，领导者的根深蒂固是阻碍治理机制提高回教保险业绩的障碍因素。因此，它有助于通过使用wakalah和混合合同类型来清楚地了解适用于回教保险有效绩效的适当治理机制。参与为董事设立有限服务期的有关监管机构应赞赏这种贡献，从而可以有效地管理和监督回教保险的做法。