Purpose

This study aims to examine institutional ownership of companies that go public with dual-class share structures.

Design/methodology/approach

Several recent studies have discussed the potential advantages and disadvantages of the dual-class structure, which allows founders and insiders to maintain control of the firms they created through superior voting rights. Institutional investors oppose the dual-class structure, arguing that inferior voting rights make it difficult to respond to poor governance or performance. Previous research has shown the early value-added to the dual-class firm declines through time. This study examines institutional ownership of dual-class companies through time and compares institutional investments in initial public offerings with perpetual superior-class structures versus those with provisions to sunset those shares to one-share, one-vote structures.

Findings

Evidence suggests that institutional investors view perpetual dual-class structures as potentially riskier in terms of poor governance or performance and prefer dual-class companies with sunset provisions.

Originality/value

This study suggests that founders and insiders should consider either the dual-class structure with a sunset provision or if they choose the perpetual dual-class, it should include some type of event-driven safeguards.

中文翻译：

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双重公司的机构所有权

目的

这项研究旨在研究具有双重股权结构的上市公司的机构所有权。

设计/方法/方法

最近的几项研究讨论了双阶级结构的潜在优缺点，这使创始人和内部人可以通过优越的投票权来维持对他们创建的公司的控制。机构投资者反对双重类别的结构，认为劣等的投票权使人们难以对糟糕的治理或业绩做出回应。先前的研究表明，两级企业的早期附加值会随着时间的推移而下降。这项研究通过时间研究了双类别公司的机构所有权，并比较了具有永久性上级结构的首次公开募股与有规定将这些股份转换为一股一票结构的机构的机构投资。

发现

有证据表明，机构投资者认为永续的双级结构在治理或绩效不佳方面可能具有更高的风险，而更倾向于具有日落条款的双级公司。

创意/价值

这项研究表明，创始人和内部人士应该考虑带有日落规定的双重类别结构，或者如果他们选择永久双重类别，则应包括某种类型的事件驱动型保障措施。