International Journal of Managerial Finance ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-05 , DOI: 10.1108/ijmf-08-2020-0459 Guoping Liu 1 , Jerry Sun 2
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine whether independent directors' financial expertise affects the use of private information in setting bank chief executive officer (CEO) bonuses.
Design/methodology/approach
The association between future firm performance and bank CEO bonuses is used to measure the incorporation of private information into bonuses. Both level and change specifications are employed to test the effect of independent directors' financial expertise on the use of private information in setting CEO bonuses.
Findings
It is found that future firm performance is more positively associated with bank CEO bonuses for banks with a higher proportion of financial experts among independent directors than for other banks. The findings suggest that independent directors with financial expertise can more effectively use private information in setting bank CEO bonuses.
Originality/value
Research on independent directors' role in the use of private information in setting compensation is valuable for understanding how corporate governance can enhance the efficiency of CEO compensation contracts. This study indicates that financial experts on the bank board play an important role in this regard.
中文翻译:
独立董事财务专业知识对利用私人信息制定银行CEO奖金的影响
目的
本研究的目的是检验独立董事的财务专业知识是否会影响在设定银行首席执行官 (CEO) 奖金时使用私人信息。
设计/方法/方法
未来公司业绩与银行 CEO 奖金之间的关联用于衡量将私人信息纳入奖金中的情况。水平和变化规范都被用来测试独立董事的财务专业知识对使用私人信息来设定 CEO 奖金的影响。
发现
研究发现,与其他银行相比,独立董事中金融专家比例较高的银行,未来公司业绩与银行 CEO 奖金呈正相关。研究结果表明,具有金融专业知识的独立董事可以更有效地利用私人信息来设定银行 CEO 奖金。
原创性/价值
研究独立董事在使用私人信息设定薪酬中的作用对于理解公司治理如何提高 CEO 薪酬合同的效率具有重要意义。这项研究表明,银行董事会的金融专家在这方面发挥了重要作用。