Purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between independent director military service and monitoring effectiveness, focusing on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors identify independent directors with military experience using BoardEx data. The authors focus on the level of CEO compensation. The methods used include panel data estimation, propensity score matching analysis and instrumental variable analysis.

Findings

The authors find more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint independent directors with past military service to the board. Boards with a larger proportion of independent directors with military experience tend to award higher levels of CEO compensation. Moreover, the positive relationship between independent directors with military experience and executive compensation is stronger when the CEO is more powerful.

Originality/value

This paper examines a relatively unexplored director background, directors with military experience, and finds this type of independent director is associated with weak monitoring. The authors contribute to the literature examining the effect of executive and board member military experience on corporations. The authors identify weak monitoring of powerful CEOs as a potential weakness of directors with military experience. This drawback should be considered before appointing a director with military experience to the board.

中文翻译：

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退伍军人在董事会和高管薪酬

目的

本研究的目的是考察独立董事兵役与监督有效性之间的关系，重点是首席执行官 (CEO) 薪酬。

设计/方法/方法

作者使用 BoardEx 数据确定了具有军事经验的独立董事。作者关注的是 CEO 的薪酬水平。使用的方法包括面板数据估计、倾向得分匹配分析和工具变量分析。

发现

作者发现，更有权势的 CEO 更有可能任命有过兵役史的独立董事进入董事会。具有军事经验的独立董事比例较大的董事会倾向于授予更高水平的 CEO 薪酬。此外，当 CEO 权力越大时，具有军事经验的独立董事与高管薪酬之间的正相关关系越强。

原创性/价值

本文考察了相对未探索的董事背景、具有军事经验的董事，并发现这种类型的独立董事与监督薄弱有关。作者对研究高管和董事会成员的军事经历对公司的影响的文献做出了贡献。作者认为对强大 CEO 的监督不力是具有军事经验的董事的潜在弱点。在任命具有军事经验的董事加入董事会之前，应考虑到这一缺点。