Purpose

This paper examines whether board structure affects microfinance institutions' (MFIs) default risk in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Design/methodology/approach

The paper uses a pooled OLS and system generalized method of moments (GMM) model on unbalanced panel data from 214 MFIs in 26 SSA countries over 2005–2016 period. Default risk is measured using non-performing loans (loans overdue 30 and 90 days) and loans written-off ratios. Board size, proportion of independent and female directors are used as proxies for board structure.

Findings

The empirical results indicate that unregulated MFIs with larger and more independent boards tend to have a lower default risk. In addition, unregulated MFIs with a female director tend to lower default risk.

Research limitations/implications

This research mainly focusses on SSA. Future research may consider a broader geographical area.

Practical implications

Poor loan portfolio quality is one of the major problems of MFIs operating in SSA. The findings of this study will contribute in emphasizing the role of an effective board structure in lowering MFI default risk.

Originality/value

This study is unique in terms of investigating whether board structure impacts default risk based on MFI regulation.

中文翻译：

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小额信贷委员会和撒哈拉以南非洲的违约风险

目的

本文研究了董事会结构是否影响撒哈拉以南非洲（SSA）的小额信贷机构（MFI）的违约风险。

设计/方法/方法

本文对2005年至2016年期间来自26个SSA国家的214个小额信贷机构的不平衡面板数据使用了汇总的OLS和系统通用矩量法（GMM）模型。违约风险使用不良贷款（逾期30天和90天的贷款）和贷款冲销率来衡量。董事会规模，独立董事和女性董事的比例被用作董事会结构的代理人。

发现

实证结果表明，拥有更大，更独立的董事会的不受监管的小额信贷机构往往具有较低的违约风险。此外，拥有女性董事的不受监管的小额信贷机构往往会降低违约风险。

研究局限/意义

这项研究主要集中在SSA上。未来的研究可能会考虑更广阔的地理区域。

实际影响

不良贷款组合质量是在撒哈拉以南非洲运作的小额信贷机构的主要问题之一。这项研究的结果将有助于强调有效的董事会结构在降低MFI违约风险中的作用。

创意/价值

这项研究在根据MFI规定调查董事会结构是否会影响违约风险方面是独一无二的。