In this paper, we examine the provision and pricing of an excludable public good with congestion under lump-sum tax/transfer, constrained by the reduction of envy. We adopt the \(\lambda \) envy-free constraint as a weaker equity concept of no-envy and characterize the optimal public sector pricing rule depending on envy reduction concerns, which is different from the pricing rule contingent on utilitarian distributive concerns. We find that the two fairness concerns are countervailing with regard to the surcharge fee.

中文翻译：

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$$ \ lambda $$λ不纯的公共物品羡慕定价

在本文中，我们研究了一次性税收/转移支付下拥挤的排他性公共物品的供应和定价，但受嫉妒的减少所限制。我们采用\（\ lambda \）无嫉妒约束作为无嫉妒的较弱股权概念，并根据嫉妒减少的关注点来描述最佳公共部门定价规则，该规则不同于基于功利主义分配关注点的定价规则。我们发现，在附加费方面，这两个公平问题正在相互抵消。