The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) were passed to address weaknesses in the internal control environment of the firm. Elements of these Acts reduce risky behavior of financial institutions by reducing informational asymmetry with borrowers. An important element of managing earnings quality in financial institutions is the loss provision, an annual expense set aside for uncollected loan and lease payments. These Acts affect the selection of loss provision expense levels in distinct ways. Using a dataset of community bank financial information observed between 1998 and 2017, it is shown that banks experience a complementary effect between SOX and DFA on loss provision expenses. Improved governance procedures to establish policy responses to nonperforming loans result in reduced expenses, whereas reduced information asymmetry tends to enhance a moral hazard effect. These results show that incentives for firm growth, income, capital, and loan specialization under the SOX and DFA regulatory environments complicate the loan risk management process.

中文翻译：

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Sarbanes-Oxley 和 Dodd-Frank 立法对美国银行贷款损失准备金的影响

2002 年的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案 (SOX) 和 2010 年的多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案 (DFA) 获得通过，以解决公司内部控制环境中的弱点。这些法案的要素通过减少与借款人的信息不对称来减少金融机构的风险行为。金融机构管理盈利质量的一个重要因素是损失准备金，这是为未收回的贷款和租赁付款而预留的年度费用。这些法案以不同的方式影响损失准备费用水平的选择。使用 1998 年至 2017 年间观察到的社区银行财务信息数据集，表明银行在 SOX 和 DFA 之间对损失准备费用产生了互补效应。改进治理程序以建立对不良贷款的政策反应导致费用减少，而信息不对称的减少往往会增强道德风险效应。这些结果表明，在 SOX 和 DFA 监管环境下对公司增长、收入、资本和贷款专业化的激励使贷款风险管理过程复杂化。